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# MID-AMERICA

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## British Business and Spanish America 1700-1800

The year 1521 marked an important turning point in the mercantile history of Europe. In that year Hernán Cortés completed his conquest of the Aztec capital which became Mexico City. He had gone in quest of a trading people similar to those found by the Portuguese in India and had found people and teeming cities. More important he had written letters glorifying himself and his conquest while presenting a highly glamorous picture of the vast wealth of the newly found empire. Word of wealth quickly spread through European marts among the merchants that the Americas might supply an abundance of the commodities for the increasing number of merchants, the long coveted raw products, the trade outlet, the gold, silver, precious stones, silks and spices.

Spain's good fortune was almost immediately to result in envy on the part of her rivals, which became deeply rooted as the decades passed and developed into a hatred of Spain that far outlives her fall in prestige. The green eyed monster first reared its head when the king of France caught the new implications of the Treaty of Tordesillas which had divided the world between Spain and Portugal. If Portugal had Africa and the Orient and Spain had the New World to say nothing of most of continental Europe, France assuredly had no mercantile future. The irate King Francis, even as Louis XII, forgetting for the moment all his Mediterranean and European intrigues demanded to be shown the will of "our common father Adam" which had made the two countries sole heirs to the world. This denial of Spain's right to take infidel lands overseas was the basis for the subsequent attacks on Spain's colonies by British, French,

Dutch and Portuguese privateers and pirates, not to mention the more recent filibusters from the United States or the proponents of the Spanish-American War.

The British attitude toward Spain's conquest of the Americas was crystalized in the time of Elizabeth when the idea became: Beyond the line of Demarcation—no law. America by this standard was still open to attack and conquest by Britishers. It was aptly rationalized two centuries later by an anonymous British author. This one set out to prove that "the sovereign sole Dominion, claimed by the crown of Spain to the West Indies, is founded upon an unjustifiable possession."<sup>1</sup> He then expounded the British pretensions:

The *vain and boundless Pretensions* of Spain to that great Continent of *America*, whose northern limits are yet unknown, and some of whose vast inland Tracts of the southern Parts have never been visited by any *European*, cannot but be surprising to all those who know upon what Footing her Pretensions are grounded; especially, when she takes upon herself to question the *lawful Rights and Possessions* of the *British Nation* in that Part of the World; and by an arbitrary, and unwarrantable Authority, pretends to set Limits and Boundaries in the greatest of Oceans, whereby to exclude all others from sailing past the same.<sup>2</sup>

The writer then offers proofs for the priority rights of the British, even using the story of Modoc, youngest son of Owen Gwyneth, Prince of Wales, and his legendary coming to America in the year 1170 in support of them. After a tirade against Spanish aggression the writer reached the conclusion which had been reached in the sixteenth century and had been acted upon since that time:

Upon the whole, this Pretended Right of *Spain*, to that Part of the World, is not to be looked upon in any other Light, than as a Thing which any other *Power* has *equal Right* to attack, and dispossess her of, without any Manner of *Scruple* or Reserve. . . .<sup>3</sup>

Who was there to gainsay the argument of the Sailor or ask to see the will of common father Adam bequeathing the trade of the world to Britain? The British of that time were well on the way to taking over all French colonies. Without taking possession of very much of the Spanish continental holdings in the Americas the British had been enjoying a flourishing trade at Portobelo, at Colonia, and at many of the ports visited by private merchants. It is possible that

<sup>1</sup> Anon., *The British Sailor's Discovery*, London, 1739, sub-title.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-3.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 31-32.

the anonymous Sailor's words were war talk, since the War of Jenkins' Ear began in the year the book was published.

The steps toward Britain's eighteenth century power on the seas, in commerce, and in business have often been recorded. Beginning with the sale of slaves to the Spaniards in the Americas in mid-sixteenth century the slavers did a highly profitable business for over two centuries in that one human commodity. The slave labor produced unheard of raw products for manufacture and consumption in the British Isles and foreign markets. When the Spanish mines in America began yielding abundant silver pirates scoured the seas for the Spanish bullion ships capturing unknown tons of silver from the 1560's on to the 1700's. The British crown during these times regularly employed outstanding pirates, since it was too costly to control them. Most memorable was Francis Drake, a most notorious scourge and vicious murderer to Spain's colonists, a gentleman adventurer to Elizabeth, the founder of the British navy, the idol of the British youth. Surely, on the principle that Spain had no rights and that a Britisher, slaver, pirate or "fence," could do no wrong, the psychology for empire building was set. The defeat of the Armada not only established a high morale and an increasing lust for seafaring on the part of the British but it threw Spain into a defensive, Spain that in 1588 controlled all of the Portuguese possessions, and therefore ruled the colonies of the world in the Orient, India, Africa and the Americas.

Britain developed manufacturing. Spain did not. Spain had no business sense nor trade inclinations; with plenty of silver and its purchasing possibilities there seemed no need to trade or manufacture or distribute. She did employ innumerable officials, clerks, tax-gatherers, and the elaborate colonial systems so familiar to students of Spanish American history, but she was not a business-minded nation.

In his scholarly work on Elizabethan England Black points out:

The Englishman of the Tudor period was not by nature or tradition an explorer or a conquistador. The cult of the map and flag was unknown to him: he had no desire to search out the distant places of the earth, or to found a new England beyond the seas . . . In other words, it was trading and buccaneering . . . that gave birth to the greatest period of English exploit on the sea.<sup>4</sup>

Pares explains the British mentality and justification for piracy when he states: "For peoples whose resources in men and especially

<sup>4</sup> J. B. Black, *The Reign of Elizabeth 1558-1603*, Oxford, 1936, 195.

in money were small, it was easier, no doubt, to fit out a plundering expedition against the galleons than to find capital for the beginning of a plantation."<sup>5</sup>

The Dover Rovers, the Sea Rovers, the Sea Dogs, the Gentlemen Adventurers assuredly made England sea-minded and colony-minded.<sup>6</sup> In the seventeenth century the amazing spectacle of the English swarming to the Americas took place. The conformists were given grants and charters to islands of the West Indies, the non-conformers to the eastern coast of North America. The beach-heads of empire were established. By the middle of the century the British middle class had taken two lessons to heart: the lesson of Spain's failure to develop a diversified economy in the presence of her silver assets, and the lesson of Dutch success.<sup>7</sup> The conclusion was that real wealth lay rather in commerce and industry, which put people to work, aided in population growth, brought in raw materials, procured markets for surplus manufactures, and educated a business class.<sup>8</sup> The Dutch had proved that gold and silver gotten through industry was of greater advantage than that acquired in other ways.<sup>9</sup>

The Cromwell era proved that the King and Lords were not capable of running the business of Empire, that is trade, and that the business heads should do so, but while the country agreed to the principle it was in no wise ready to allow dissenters and non-conformists to take the helm. The Glorious Revolution on its economic side decided the issue that Commoners were the successors to rather than the servants of royal administrators. It would be their enterprise to continue the mercantilist tradition in the Americas, particularly in Spanish America where Spain was failing. The eighteenth century reveals the application of the well digested principles as the literature of the period reveals.

Erasmus Philipps, in his *State of the Nation*, compares money in itself, that is without trade, to "stagnated Water," since it is just about as useful. Spain, he tells us,

is a living Instance of this Truth; the Mines of *Peru* and *Mexico* made that

<sup>5</sup> R. Pares, *War and Trade in the West Indies 1739-1763*, Oxford, 1936, 1-2.

<sup>6</sup> Black, *Reign of Elizabeth*, 320.

<sup>7</sup> It should be remembered here that throughout the sixteenth century men were attempting to analyze the roots and foundations of power, just as on the religious side they were debating the authority of the Scriptures and religious leaders and the Church.

<sup>8</sup> E. A. Benians, "Financial Experiments and Colonial Development," in *The Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. VI, Chapter VI, 168.

<sup>9</sup> Pares, *War and Trade in the West Indies*, 2.



People think themselves above Industry; an Innundation of Gold and Silver swept away all useful Arts, and a total Neglect of Labour and Commerce has made them as it were the Receivers only for the rest of the World.<sup>10</sup>

Philipps then considers Holland as a typical example of what trade can do for a nation. Feeble in origin, small in size, and with few natural resources, she has become the "Seat of Riches and Plenty," and this in spite of her constant battle with the sea, in spite of the great Monarchies that surround her.

Earlier still, Daniel Defoe of Robinson Crusoe fame, writing in his *Review*, looked with scorn on nations like Spain which valued themselves upon abstracted nobility and made it criminal to their characters to mix with the trading part of the people.<sup>11</sup> The following excerpt shows how strongly Defoe felt about the importance of trade to the English nation:

England is a Trading Nation, . . . and the Blood of Trade is mixed and blended with the Blood of Gallantry, so that Trade is the Life of the Nation, the soul of its Felicity, the Spring of its Wealth, the Support of its Greatness, and the Staff on which both King and People lean, and which (if it should sink) the whole Fabrick must fall, the Body Politick would sicken and languish, its Power decline, and the Figure it makes in the World, grow by degrees, most Contemptibly Mean.<sup>12</sup>

Erasmus Philipps, possibly following Defoe's lead, also likens trade to human blood. It diffuses itself by the tiniest arteries into every part of a nation and gives it life and strength. Without trade no nation can expect to be happy. Nor can she defend herself against the attacks of external foes.<sup>13</sup>

If then upon trade the very "riches and grandeur of this nation chiefly depended," as the king himself remarked in 1721,<sup>14</sup> it was evident that a favorable balance must be struck at all costs. What contemporaries understood by a favorable balance of trade is patent from the following citations. Thus William Wood, in his *Survey of Trade*, sets down what he calls the four "Marks of a Beneficial Trade." In substance these are as follows. (1) That is good trade which absorbs superfluous home manufactures. (2) Beneficial too is that which brings in raw products of manufacture especially when

<sup>10</sup> Erasmus Philipps, *The State of the Nation In Respect to her Commerce, Debts, and Money*, London, 1725, 2-3.

<sup>11</sup> *Defoe's Review*, C. M. Andrews, ed. Publication No. 44 of the Facsimile Text Society, New York, 1938, March 6, 1705, II, No. 3, p. 9.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> Philipps, *The State of the Nation*, 1-2.

<sup>14</sup> H. W. V. Temperly, "The Age of Walpole and the Pelhams," *The Cambridge Modern History*, VI, Chapter II, 49.

exchanged for finished wares. (3) Advantage is also had when "manufactures [are exchanged] for manufactures, commodities for commodities." Even when money is paid as part of the price this is agreeable to good business if the major part of the wares thus brought in are resold out of the nation. (4) Generally speaking the re-exporting of imports is always advantageous, since in this way the carrying-trade of the nation is furthered.<sup>15</sup> The maxims for testing the value of every trade which Wood then lists, repeat over and over the virtues of a favorable balance of trade.

Similarly the merchant-author of the *Address to Merchants* points out that Britain's imports are bought with her exports,

and from this Touch-stone, may we not form a good Judgment of our Exports? And when we have every desirable *Criterion* whereby to determine that our *Sales* to Foreigners exceed our *Purchases* of them, this is all that is needful to be considered, either with Regard to the Gain of the Nation, or the Merchant. . . . The Balance is the only Thing that determines the national Profit or Loss.<sup>16</sup>

A few years later Cary in his *Discourse on Trade* set down three general rules warranted to win the approval of all "unbiased persons." The first is that such trade is advantageous which absorbs the produce and manufactures of the land. The second factor to determine an advantageous trade is whether or not it brings in a supply of raw materials and increases gold and silver. Thirdly it must further navigation and beget sailors.<sup>17</sup>

Malachy Postlethwayt following Child adds to the question a somewhat new angle. After assuring his readers that "an advantageous balance is chiefly the fruit of the several mechanic branches of commerce," he sets down four so-called "fundmental points" towards which every single trade operation should tend. The first and third of these boil down to what has already been stated by others. The second would have such operations increase the number of working-men, and the last would seek to have foreigners "find their account" while trading with Great Britain.<sup>18</sup> These two points are seen to hang together to a certain extent, for, in the introduction to his work, Postlethwayt bewails the high price of British wares.<sup>19</sup> In his first dissertation he explains that high prices might be remedied by

<sup>15</sup> William Wood, *Survey of Trade*, London, 1722, 81-82.

<sup>16</sup> Anon., *Address to Merchants*, London, [1738], 42.

<sup>17</sup> John Cary, *A Discourse on Trade*, London, 1745, 42.

<sup>18</sup> Malachy Postlethwayt, *British Commercial Interests explained and improved*, London, 1757, II, 528.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, *Dedication*, I, v-vi.



bringing all available land into cultivation thereby forestalling scarcity of grain. The idea is deflationary, to drive down living costs, therefore costs of labor, therefore costs of wares. In this way foreign merchants will buy British commodities.

The concern over cost of labor was not new in Postlethway's time. Already in 1702 Sir Francis Brewster, claiming that the surest way to enrich the nation was "the full Employment of all Hands in the Nation," would have the poor set to work at home and on the high seas.<sup>20</sup> Philipps was all for erecting work-houses in every parish and putting the poor to work, thereby obliging them to support themselves, especially by spinning and carding,<sup>21</sup> a foreshadowing here by nearly a century of the poor law of 1834. Daniel Defoe was also interested in "setting the Poor to work upon something," but he insisted on this one qualification—that the article had never been made in England before. Rather he held that it should be some foreign product which hitherto had to be bought with money. In this way poor houses would not deprive English workingmen of a livelihood such as they had been enjoying.<sup>22</sup>

John Cary, who is referred to as being "a very considerable Merchant at Bristol," would go farther still to obtain his cherished ideal of a nation in business.<sup>23</sup> Not only would he improve labor conditions by putting the poor to work in houses provided for the purpose, but he would have Justices of the Peace assign youths to artificers, manufacturers, farmers, and the like. Beggars should be forced to serve King or merchant on the sea, the sea being a good cure "fore Legs and Arms, especially such as are Counterfeits." Ale houses, coffee shops and similar places should be cared for only by aged folks, or such as have large families. Young people are to be prevented from "Hawking about the Streets, and from Singing Ballads." If such amusements be allowed at all, Cary said, let them be for the aged. Plays, lotteries, gaming-houses are to be under rigid supervision since they tend towards idleness and love of ease in youths. In this way Parliament may help to beget a "Habit of Virtue," and make many people serviceable who before are useless.

Not merely on the poor did writers on economics concentrate their efforts. If trade and industry meant so much to the nation,

<sup>20</sup> Sir Francis Brewster, *New Essays on Trade*, London, 1702, v.

<sup>21</sup> Philipps, *State of the Nation*, 8-9.

<sup>22</sup> Defoe's *Review*, March 24, 1705, No. 9, 34.

<sup>23</sup> Cary, *Discourse on Trade*, 21-22, 109-110.

then *all* loyal Englishmen should strive to further the same. First, however, they must be made aware of the situation, and hence the ever recurring theme-song on the necessity of national solidarity behind the nation's business. A typical example of what is meant may be found in the *Address to Merchants*. There the author quotes a "great Philosopher and Political" as follows:

If ever, says he, the *English* would attain to the Mastery of Commerce, not only in Discourse, but Reality, they must do it by their Labours as well as by their Swords: Unless this be done they will in vain be victorious; at the End of their Wars they will cool again, and lose all the Fruits of their Valour: The Arts of Peace, and their Improvements in Manufacture and Inventions of every Kind must proceed in equal Steps with the Success of their Arms; The Works of our *Citizens* . . . must be equally advanced with the Triumphs of our *Fleets*, or else their Blood will be shed in vain: they will soon return to the same Poverty and want of Trade which they strove to avoid.<sup>24</sup>

Richard Campbell wrote his *London Tradesman* for the express purpose of informing parents and instructing youths in the various trades, the better to enable them to make a suitable choice of a way of life.<sup>25</sup> One after another, physician, attorney, refiner, carpenter, carver, mercer, packer, founder, and their offices, are dealt with in the course of the work. In how very real a sense the business man had become the hero of the age may be gathered from Campbell's description of the merchant.<sup>26</sup> Campbell first points out that traders, such as those mentioned above, are confined to a specified locality whereas the merchant has the whole world as his domain. Again, while some crafts give employment to several others, the merchant sets them all to work by vending their fruits the world over. Moreover, the various arts of the land operate, as it were, in a closed circle and never add a single sixpence to the wealth of the nation. On the other hand the merchant "draws his honest gain from the distant poles," bringing enormous wealth to the land. Campbell concludes that it is therefore scarcely to be wondered at that Commerce is so courted by the wisest and politest nations.

Even in the eighteenth century it would seem that land-owners were beginning to be wary of industrialism. Hence the land-owners too would have to be educated. This Sir M. Decker attempted to do in an essay published in 1756, whose stated purpose was "to

<sup>24</sup> *Address to Merchants*, 49-50.

<sup>25</sup> R. Campbell, *The London Tradesman*, London, 1747, sub-title.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter lxxi, 284.

prove the strong connexion, in point of interest between land and trade."<sup>27</sup> Wood in his tract had a similar motive when he stated: "The Price of Land, Value of Rents, our Home Commodities and Manufactures *Rise or Fall*, as it goes well or ill with our *Foreign Trade*."<sup>28</sup>

The writers of the period were ever anxious to keep the support of the monarch. Wood in his dedication to King George II is particularly flattering on the surface, but obviously careful to instruct the king on the principles of business:

Without being Rich and Populous a Nation can never be Great and Powerful; and since we have a *Prince* on the Throne, who, above all Things, delights and places *his* Glory in *his* People's Happiness . . . this Nation can expect no less . . . than to become the greatest and most flourishing People in the World.<sup>29</sup>

John Cary thought it a wonderful idea that the Prince of Wales should have been Governor of the South Sea Company, since he would thus be allured "into an Early liking of Trade," and informed of the "Advantages that Accrue from it, with the Methods whereby it may be Improved."<sup>30</sup>

By the middle of the seventeenth century trade with Spain and Spanish America had become a primary objective for the merchants of Great Britain. Considering what has already been said the reasons for this are not hard to discover. As Pares remarks: "The Spanish West Indies had for the trader as well as the pirate all the charm of the remote and fabulous. The legend of the great American market superseded the legend of the Golden Man, or rather grew up by its side. It was not impossible to combine plundering the Spaniards and trading with them; but it was not very easy."<sup>31</sup> This latter fact is amply stressed in the politics and wars of the period.

Even in the time of Charles V, Spain had to rely on industrial countries for a large part of the manufactured products she used in trade. The result was that, in spite of efforts to the contrary, Spanish gold and silver flowed into the nations of Europe.<sup>32</sup> One con-

<sup>27</sup> Sir M. Decker, *An Essay on the Causes of The Decline of Foreign Trade*, Edinburgh, 1756, Preface, vi.

<sup>28</sup> Wood, *Survey of Trade*, Introduction, 4.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>30</sup> Cary, *Discourse on Trade*, Dedication, iii-iv.

<sup>31</sup> Pares, *War and Trade in the West Indies*, 5.

<sup>32</sup> Klaus E. Knorr, *English Colonial Theories 1570-1830*, Toronto, 1944, 36.

temporary gives an excellent description of what was actually taking place. He writes:

The *Spaniards* are a stately People, not much given to Trade or Manufactures themselves; therefore the first they carry on by such chargeable and dilatory Methods both for their Ships and ways of Navigation, that other trading Nations, such as the *English, French, Dutch, and Genoese*, take Advantage of them; only their Trade to their West-Indies, hath, on strict Penalties, been reserved to themselves; but having no Manufactures of their own, the Profit thereof comes very much to be reaped by those who furnish them: Nor is it so well guarded and secured, but that the Inhabitants thereof have been plentifully supplied by us with Manufactures, and many other Things from Jamaica. . . .<sup>33</sup>

It is scarcely necessary here to delve at any great length into Spain's peculiar mercantile system as modified in the eighteenth century. With the consolidation of the various European monarchies, it was not merely politics, the military, and even religion that were nationalized. The economic life of the nation was also affected. This was not only true of European nations as such but even more particularly of the colonies held by them. In the case of the Hispanic Americas, as Chapman points out, government and business in the colonies were almost inseparably associated.<sup>34</sup> In the first place the land, soil and subsoil alike, was owned by the crown to be parcelled out by it as by any private owner. Nor could an individual do with his holdings entirely as he pleased.

As a correlary to the current economic theory that wealth lay in bullion, it was held that the colonies existed pretty much for the benefit of the mother country. The colonies were to supply raw products of trade; the mother country would furnish the finished products. Hence the legislation preventing the colonies from certain types of manufacture, stopping them from raising certain products, and obliging them to produce others. Hence too the monopolistic control of gold, silver and quicksilver production in Hispanic America. Similar ends were also had in mind when laws were enacted causing traffic between mother and daughter countries to be carried on by natives of one or the other. Direct foreign trade was not only discouraged; it was absolutely prohibited. Furthermore, trade between Spanish merchants and colonists was restricted to designated ports, Cádiz and Seville in the Old World and to Cartagena, Portobelo, Vera Cruz, and a few others in the New. The element of

<sup>33</sup> Cary, *Discourse on Trade*, 65-66.

<sup>34</sup> Charles E. Chapman, *Colonial Hispanic America*, New York, 1933, 145.

control loomed large in all such regulation. Such conduct was so much a part of European thought that even Daniel Defoe considered it to be just as well as effective to keep the commerce and the land itself in Spanish hands.<sup>35</sup>

Due to her needs Spain was forced to make certain concessions to foreign merchants, principal among them the trade rights at Portobelo by the Asiento of 1713. Besides this there were several alternatives open to such merchants. The simplest of these was to sell their wares outright to the Spaniards, who in turn shipped them to the Indies. The more venturesome were inclined to handle the whole affair themselves, sending their wares directly to the colonies with the help of Spanish "cover-men" just as privateers had been doing in England. Or finally, they might simply act as bankers, lending money to the Spanish merchants and later taking their slice in the profits.<sup>36</sup> The policy employed in each instance would be determined largely by prevalent risks, which in turn were modified by conditions of war or peace.

Up to about the middle of the eighteenth century at least the position of British merchants in the Spanish trade seems to have been quite advantageous. Postlethwayt, writing in 1757, gives indication of the tremendous volume of this trade when he says that it was not uncommon to see as many as three to five hundred foreign vessels in the various ports of Spain. Seldom were there less than two hundred. In Cádiz alone there were at times gathered as many as two hundred British ships. Many of these latter, Postlethwayt indicates, were there to dispose of fish. Others were engaged in acting as carriers for Spain to and from the nations of all Europe. Indeed, not only Hamburg, Holland, the North Seas, and Italy had seen British sails in this trade, but Turkey and Barbary as well. Hence it was ever worth while for Spain to maintain peace and friendship with Great Britain. Hence too the adage: "*Paz con Angleterra con todos otros la guerra.*"<sup>37</sup>

The full nature of the commodities exchanged in the Spanish

<sup>35</sup> Defoe's *Review*, Saturday, June 30, 1711, VIII, 170. Defoe does not seem to have favored free trade with Spain at this point. Free trade would have favored all nations, while a restricted trade would have enabled the English to make a "deal" with Spain. The British, he felt, could best supply Spain with the products she needed and in turn was able to use what materials she had to sell.

<sup>36</sup> Allan Christelow, "Great Britain and the Trades from Cadiz and Lisbon to Spanish America and Brazil," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, XXVII, February, 1947, 3.

<sup>37</sup> Postlethwayt, *Britain's Commercial Interest*, II, 462-463.



trade is also indicated by contemporary pamphleteers together with the importance of that trade. Wood, for example, mentions that "beys, says, perpets, cloth, stuffs, cotton, worsted and silk hose, &c." were sent to Spain in addition to the fish mentioned above. In return the British received "wine, oil, wool, cochineal, fruit, iron, &c. . . and the balance in bullion." Wood further mentions that this balance in bullion, though lately diminished, was formerly very great.<sup>38</sup> John Cary, dividing the Spanish trade into three parts, *viz.* Spain, Biscay and Flanders, lists the exports to Spain proper as "all sorts of woolen Manufactures, Lead, Fish, Tin, Silk and Worsted Stockings, Butter, Tobacco, Ginger, Leather, Bees-Wax, and sundry other things." From Spain are had fruits, wines, oil, cochineal, indigo, anata, barilla, "with a great part in Gold and Silver."<sup>39</sup> Imports and exports to and from the remaining two sections mentioned are similar to those of Spain proper though in lesser quantities.<sup>40</sup>

The importance that the British attached to the Spanish-American trade, direct or indirect, cannot be exaggerated. Not merely was there question here of a lucrative market, but England had come to rely greatly on American products, particularly leather, dye-stuffs, and drugs, to say nothing of bullion for her economic needs. England needed American gold and silver to carry on her Asiatic trade; she needed dye-stuffs in her woolen industry, and raw and tanned leather in great quantities to supply a growing European market for leather goods. At the same time American drugs, such for example as Jesuit bark and sarsaparilla among others, seem to have taken on some of the aspects of a fetish being capable as was piously believed of curing the bodily ills of Europe. Thus, concludes Daniel Defoe,

the Riches of the World, the Valuable Drugs, the useful Dying Stuffs, and Dying Woods, the Sugars, Tobacco, rich Furs, and the Fish, as well as Gold and Silver, are by the wise appointment of the Great Disposer of all things, Dispersed over the whole Country to make the Nations of Europe beholding them obliged to visit them, and consequently to bring to them again in Exchange the things they wanted from Europe . . . of which they would still have remain'd Ignorant and Untaught in, if they had not been able to bribe us with their own Native Stores to come to them. . . .<sup>41</sup>

<sup>38</sup> Wood, *Survey of Trade*, 86-87.

<sup>39</sup> Cary, *Discourse on Trade*, 64-65.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> Daniel Defoe, *A General History of Trade*, London, 1713, 18.

If then there was so great an economic interdependence between Great Britain and Spain, how it is that these two nations were so frequently at war with one another during the two centuries following the Armada? In answer to this query it should be remembered that, in the first place, British "war-mongers" did not always get their way. Among the merchant class there were ever strong protagonists for peace. Thus, in 1738, one merchant-author chides those dissatisfied with the administration because the latter did not want war with Spain. Rather, after twenty-six years of war, it was high time that the nation thought of recouping her losses and gaining back the commerce which had been lost in the interim to the various neutral nations of Europe.<sup>42</sup> This same author then points out that the wise Monarchs of Europe have become "so tender of their Trade . . . that they seem all agreed, as it were, to lay aside the Sword, and instead of conversing by the Thunder of their Cannon, give Preference to Negotiation."<sup>43</sup> Once some of the other nations have become as war-torn as England, France, and Holland, they too will act in like manner. The conclusion is then reached that, if the "deluded citizens" really understood the situation, they would call for peace as loudly as they now clamour for war.<sup>44</sup>

Similarly Campbell in his *London Tradesman* bewails the sad state of trade. The Dutch have run off with some of it. King William's and Queen Ann's War meant high taxes. After the latter especially, the French robbed the English of considerable trade. The Danes, Swedes, and Russians were taking the rest, so that there were scarcely a trade in which the balance was not against the British. Even the Negro trade has been wholly engrossed by the French, etc., etc.<sup>45</sup>

That the statesmen of the time saw eye-to-eye with the merchants is indicated by Walpole in a letter to the Duke of Bedford, July 2, 1748.

All that I shall say at present is, that nothing can be more beneficial to the trade of England than to establish and cultivate a strict friendship with Spain; because the preservation of the peace, and particularly of our commerce, will depend upon a real friendship more than upon the words or stipulation of the treaties: and now there is, I hope, a prince upon that throne that is of a pacific temper, and a true Spaniard, that must therefore

<sup>42</sup> *Address to Merchants*, 5, 15.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 17-18.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>45</sup> Campbell, *London Tradesman*, 286-291.

be desirous to free his subjects from the great oppressions and losses that they have suffered by the war.<sup>46</sup>

Similar sentiments were indicated by Sir Charles Whitworth some years later. Quoting a French author, he pointed out that war alone did not determine the superiority of nations. Rather, for more than half a century, the balance of power had come to depend on commerce.<sup>47</sup>

Defoe also had some strong ideas on the question of peace and war, but they seem to have changed with the times. Thus, writing in the *Review* for January 24, 1713, at the end of Queen Ann's War, he held peace to be the foundation of commerce and stated that no nation ever grows rich by war, which of its very nature is a destroyer. Then, some years later, when war again loomed on the horizon, he called to mind the adage that "England may gain by a war with France, but never loses by a war with Spain." Indeed he made it his stated opinion that England would lose nothing if she *never* had peace with Spain, and that she had more to gain from such a continued war than the Spanish had from their prolonged war with Turk and Moor.<sup>48</sup>

Defoe based this opinion on the assumption that the people of Hispanic America were not content with prevailing conditions, and that they would satisfy their need for European goods by dealing with foreigners in case of war. Nor could the Spaniards stop this trade. Furthermore, he asked, "How are the Spaniards sure, that if the Inhabitants of *America* shall at any time come into a free Trade with *Europe*, by Means of a War, they will ever be brought to quit that Commerce again?"<sup>49</sup>

Behind all this lies the key to the difference that led to such constant strife between Great Britain and Spain. For, no matter what the terms of the peace or the advantages gained for British commercial interests, British merchants were wont to go a step farther in their pursuit of business. The Spaniards resented such conduct and acted accordingly. The *Guardas Costas* were perhaps at times a bit over zealous in attempting to stop the more ventur-

<sup>46</sup> Lord John Russell, ed., *Correspondence of John Fourth Duke of Bedford*, 3 vols., London, 1842-1846, I, 391-392.

<sup>47</sup> Sir Charles Whitworth, *State of Trade of Great Britain*, London, 1776, I, as in Knorr, *British Colonial Theories*, 22.

<sup>48</sup> Daniel Defoe, *Evident Advantages to Great Britain and its Allies from the Approaching War*, London, 1721, 15.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 43, 21-22.



some merchants of Great Britain. Differences ensued which periodically grew to proportions sufficient to cause outright war. Not always were the statesmen of either side able to placate their constituents.<sup>50</sup>

The smuggling of contraband goods into the Spanish colonies had been taking place from earliest times. Not only the English, but the Dutch and French had become past masters at the art. It was not difficult for a small ship to slip along an ill-guarded coast, notify the inhabitants of its presence, sell its wares and then quietly sail off once the business was accomplished.<sup>51</sup> Well rewarded complaint officials offered no little help in the matter. Coming into the eighteenth century, the British were able from Juan Fernández to supply large quantities of goods to Chile and Peru. From Nova Colonia to Sacramento the Plata area was supplied, from Jamaica the Islands and shores of the Caribbean.

The Asiento of 1713, which granted to the English South Sea Company the right to bring into Spanish America 4,800 Negroes a year for thirty years, only made matters worse. Centers of distribution were set up not only in English held lands, but at certain strategic points in Hispanic America as well. Among these latter were Buenos Aires, Arequipa, Panama, Portobelo, Cartagena, Santiago de Cuba, Vera Cruz, Campeche, Mexico City, Lima, Potosí, and Santiago de Chile.<sup>52</sup> The original purpose of these establishments was the disposal of Negroes. However they served as admirable covers for all sorts of contraband activity. Similarly the one British ship of 500 tons permitted under the treaty at Portobelo came to be fed by a system of tenders so that the merchandise shipped into the Isthmus came to be almost unlimited.<sup>53</sup> No wonder Cary called the Negro trade "our Silver Mine," not only be-

<sup>50</sup> Ernest H. Hildner, Jr., in "The Role of the South Sea Company in the Diplomacy Leading to the War of Jenkins' Ear," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, August, 1938, shows how in large part the "selfish narrow views" of the Company paved the way for the war of 1739.

<sup>51</sup> Salvador de Madariaga, *The Rise of the Spanish American Empire*, New York, 1947, 130. Cf. Captain Nathaniel Uring, *A History of the Voyage and Travels of Captain Nathaniel Uring*, London, 1726, 164-165, for an interesting description of such a venture.

<sup>52</sup> George H. Nelson, "Contraband Trade Under the Asiento, 1730-1739," *American Historical Review*, LI, October, 1945, 57.

<sup>53</sup> For interesting material on such activity cf. James Houstoun, *The Works of James Houstoun*, London, 1753, 198-199; Judith Blow Williams, "The Establishment of British Commerce with Argentina," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XV, February, 1934, 44; A. C. Loosely, "The Puerto Bello Fairs," *Ibid.*, XIII, August, 1933, 335.

cause of the sale of Negroes but because it was this together with the Asiento "which first introduced our Manufactures to them."<sup>54</sup>

Spanish officialdom was by no means unaware of what was taking place. In a report presented to Charles III in 1761 it was stated that the English were the worst offenders in the contraband trade in which their share was at least 6,000,000 pesos a year, and this in spite of the most sacred treaties.<sup>55</sup> In view of the above one is somewhat surprised to find Bedford writing to Keene in February, 1751, that neither he

nor any of his Majesty's servants here are conscious of any illicit trade being carried on from hence, which is in our power to prevent, and all his Majesty's governors abroad have the strongest orders to comply strictly with the forms prescribed in several treaties now subsisting between the two crowns.<sup>56</sup>

Though this letter was marked "most secret," Bedford would have done well to have caused it to fall into the hands of the Spaniards!

As a final step indicating Great Britain's tremendous interest in the Spanish Americas, a word might be said about her colonizing activities in Central and South American waters. It comes as somewhat of a shock to the average citizen of the United States that the thirteen original colonies were frequently considered as being of very secondary importance to the British. Nor was John Cary the first to "look upon *New England* to bring the least Advantage" to the Mother Country.<sup>57</sup> Further indication of this is had in the type of people who settled the two areas. To the North came largely Puritans, Separatists, Quakers, Catholics, Dissenters of all sorts. On the other hand a survey of the Islands to the south shows that they were for the most part under the control of the privileged Anglicans. Again, during the Commonwealth, when the Northern Colonies were largely neglected, a vigorous "Western Campaign" was carried on in the Caribbean. The influence of the Island planters on colonial policy after the monarchy was again established is also significant. The key to this situation is found in the fact that riches through trade were to be had in the West Indies rather than in the Northern Colonies.

<sup>54</sup> Cary, *Discourse on Trade*, 53-55.

<sup>55</sup> Allan Christelow, "Contraband Trade Between Jamaica and the Spanish Main, and the Free Port Act of 1766," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, XXII, May, 1942, 313.

<sup>56</sup> Bedford to Keene, February 11-17, 1750-1751, in Russell, *Correspondence*, II, 72.

<sup>57</sup> Cary, *Discourse on Trade*, 51.

The importance of the Caribbean area was manifest to the British long before the first permanent settlements were established in the North American sphere. As early as 1584 Hakluyt had suggested in his *Discourse on Western Planting* that

the plantinge of twoo or three stronge fortes upon some goodd havens (whereof there is great store) betweene Florida and Cape Briton, woulde be a matter in shorte space of greater damage as well to his flete as to his westerne Indies; for wee shoulde not onely often tymes indaunger his flete in returne thereof, but also in fewe yeres put him in hazarde in loosinge some parte of Nova Hispania. . . . And entringe into the consideration of the way how this Phillippe may be abased, I meane firste to begynne with the West Indies, as there to laye a chefe foundation for his overthrowe.<sup>58</sup>

A similar policy was advocated in 1623 by Sir Benjamin Rudyard, who urged that the Spanish King be cut up at the root and "impeached" or supplanted in the West Indies.<sup>59</sup> By 1640, when John Pym was urging the King to force his way into the Spanish West Indies and thus "easily make his majesty master of all that treasure,"<sup>60</sup> the English were fair on their way towards culling sizeable holdings out of the left-over spots of the West Indies. A brief resume of how this was done will not be out of place here.

Barbados was obtained in 1605 when visited by the British ship *Blossom*.<sup>61</sup> It was settled in 1625. The Bermudas came next in 1609. Though previously discovered by the Spaniards they had never been settled. St. Kitts, discovered by Columbus in 1493, was first settled by Sir Thomas Warner in 1623. Nevis and Barbuda were added in 1628. In the year following the Bahamas, also unsettled by the Spaniards, were included in the grant giving the Carolinas to Sir Robert Heath. Montserrat was colonized under Warner in 1632. In 1638 British sailors secured a foothold in Honduras, though it was not until the 1660s that a logwood business was established there from Jamaica, which had been taken from Spain in May 1655. In 1652 the British secured a foothold in Guiana; however this was ceded to the Dutch in 1667 in return for New York. In 1781 a footing was again secured there, which

<sup>58</sup> Richard Hakluyt, *A Discourse concerning Western Planting*, 1584, printed from a contemporary Manuscript, Charles Deane, editor, Cambridge, 1877, 45, 55.

<sup>59</sup> Leo Francis Stock, *Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments respecting North America*, 5 vols., Washington, 1924-1941, I, 62.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 98.

<sup>61</sup> The dates followed in this paragraph are for the most part those given by Helen Rex Keller, *The Dictionary of Dates*, 2 vols., New York, 1934, II, 557-580.

was ultimately to grow into British Guiana. Tortola of the Virgin Island group was occupied in 1666. The Turks and Caicos Islands were acquired through Bermuda. Uninhabited before 1678 they were first visited at that time by inhabitants of Bermuda because of their salt deposits.

The places mentioned above were to comprise the more important holdings of the British in Spanish American waters. However their seizure does not tell the whole story, since, throughout the colonial period the British were ever on the alert for further strategically situated lands. The entire litoral from Florida down round the Strait of Magellan and up into the Californias was periodically viewed for possible holdings. Even the unhospitable shores of baron Patagonia were seriously considered for their vantage point in the lucrative South Sea trade. All this is important for fully understanding the great zest which the British were to manifest in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in their quest of trade and commerce.

The sketch here given of Great Britain's conduct of affairs in colonial Hispanic America has been brief in the extreme. However, it will be sufficient to indicate the tremendous interest which the British,—privateers, adventurers, merchants, and statesmen,—had in the Americas. As they saw it, it was upon trade, not on gold and silver alone, that the well-being of their nation rested. In particular they were interested in trade with the Americas. The reason for this was that there they could exchange their wares for raw products so necessary to further manufacture, and for bullion. The oriental trade to be sure was very valuable, but was to be engaged in with caution, since it might drain Great Britain of her bullion and end in mercantile, to say nothing of national calamity. In the Spanish trade there was no such danger. Quite the opposite, and therefore its great value.

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## Troops to Red River

On May 20, 1870, a military expedition of modest proportions embarked from Collingwood, Ontario, on the south shore of Georgian Bay, on an arduous enterprise. It made its way slowly across Lake Superior to Thunder Bay, Ontario, on the north shore. From here it crossed the watershed, plunged through swamp and forest to Lake Winnipeg, and entered the Red River of the North. Its goal: Fort Garry and the Red River Settlement, the present Ste. Boniface and Winnipeg, Manitoba.

The official purpose of this expedition was shrouded in mystery at the time. Neither the Canadian Government nor the Imperial Government made public any satisfactory explanation. The result was confusion in the popular mind. Some thought it was nothing but a symbolic gesture. Others concluded that its purpose was punitive and warlike. The very composition of this body did not make for clarity. Its nucleus was regular troops of the imperial army, but the remainder were Canadian volunteers, mostly from Ontario. Its leader was an ambitious officer of the British forces, Colonel Garnet J. Wolesley.

If it had been question of a war to fight, pure and simple, the military could have acted with definiteness and dispatch. Such, however, was not the case. Both governments, Canadian and Imperial, were dickering and parrying with each other in such manner as to achieve the greater good for itself while making the lesser commitment. The result was diplomatic obscurantism leading to popular clamor, military delay, and constitutional confusion. We shall endeavor to learn the true purpose of this expedition and the manner in which that purpose was fulfilled.

## Formation of Official Canadian Policy

Let us recall the facts. On July 1, 1867, after three years of careful negotiations and debate, British possessions north of the United States were united into the Dominion of Canada. Next, Rupert's Land, from Lake Superior to the Rockies, was to be sold by the Hudson's Bay Company to the Imperial Government of Britain, that is, its charter was to be retired for 300,000 pounds sterling. The Imperial Government was to be reimbursed in this amount by the new Dominion of Canada to which the territory was



to be added. The most populous portion of the vast expanse was the area in the Red River Settlement around the Assiniboine River flowing east and the Red flowing north. On the west bank of the Red River was the important Hudson's Bay Company post, Fort Garry, site of present Winnipeg about 350 miles northwest of St. Paul, Minnesota. Across the river was St. Boniface, settled by French speaking Métis.

In Britain the Gladstone ministry ruled, liberal, *laissez-faire*, and not too enthusiastic about overly strong ties between overseas possessions and the motherland. Lord Granville was Colonial Secretary in the Gladstone cabinet and in immediate charge of relations with Canada. In the recently established North American Dominion the ministry of John A. Macdonald held sway, Conservative, closely attached to the mother-country, and indeed more Empire-minded than Gladstone himself.

The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 had provided for the admission of new states into the American union on a basis of equality with the original thirteen. However, the addition of the "great lone land" between Lake Superior and British Columbia to the new Dominion of Canada was not to be done in the same way. The former preserve of the Hudson's Bay Company would in effect be a "colony of a colony," a not very enviable position. Hence the protest movement of the native Métis (Half-breed) people led by Louis Riel and the Provisional Government established there which sought more equitable terms of admission to the Canadian Dominion. Fifteen years after the events described in the present article Louis Riel became mentally unhinged while leading the Saskatchewan Rising of French Métis and Indians, 1885. He had one-eighth Indian blood. At the time of his protest movement at Red River Settlement he was in his middle-twenties and a natural leader of the illiterate Métis both because of his Montreal education and the reputation of his father before him. Upon the invitation of Canada's Prime Minister the Métis had sent their delegates on March 23, 1870, to Ottawa to work out an agreement. By June 17 the delegates, Father N. J. Ritchot, pastor of St. Norbert's parish a few miles south of St. Boniface, and Alfred H. Scott, a Winnipeg merchant, had returned to Red River, while the third, Judge John Black, had gone on to England. The new terms granted provincial status to the Red River area. They were found acceptable when presented to the Provisional Government and ratified. The new

province of Manitoba was thus to be admitted to the Dominion of Canada on July 15, 1870.

If the issue had thus been settled to the apparent satisfaction of both the Canadian Government and the people of Red River why was there need of a military expedition sent with so much effort and expense? Why could it not be simply a matter of hoisting the flag of Canada and accepting the Governor appointed by the Dominion? During the Winter and Spring of 1869-1870 a good deal more than could meet the eye had occurred both at Red River and at Ottawa. Mutual suspicions dominated negotiations.

The original governor designated by Prime Minister Macdonald for the "Northwest" was William McDougall, the personification of all that the Métis feared with respect to their future status. His premature and blundering effort to install himself at Red River was prevented by the native inhabitants. Despite Macdonald's advice that he should conciliate his future subjects, he achieved a result exactly opposite. He it was who seems to have been the first to recommend that troops should be employed for the forceful maintenance of his authority. This he indicated in his very first report from Pembina, Dakota Territory, October 31, 1869<sup>1</sup> This report arrived in the Canadian capital on November 19, 1869, and the notion of employing troops was planted in the Prime Minister's mind. Four days later Macdonald wrote to Captain D. R. Cameron, who was with McDougall at Pembina, about possible use of a military force to establish Canadian authority at Red River. "If this complication is going to last, we must look forward to the necessity of sending a force via Lake Superior and the Lake of the Woods."<sup>2</sup> Thus even at this early date the Canadian Prime Minister showed his basic distrust of the Métis at Red River. It was a distrust, however, that he was cautious not to make public as did the inept McDougall.

The frustrated and angry Governor-designate, balked at the International Boundary, was simple enough to believe that Canadian soldiers dressed as civilians could be assembled in Minnesota. Forming with these a two-pronged attack, he suggested that a main Canadian body march from Fort William on the north shore of Lake Superior after having been transported there by boat.<sup>3</sup> McDougall's

<sup>1</sup> Cf. McDougall to Macdonald, *Macdonald Papers*, "Northwest Rebellion, 1869-1870," Vol. 2, 99.

<sup>2</sup> Macdonald to Cameron, November 23, 1869, *Letterbooks*, Vol. 13, 529.

<sup>3</sup> "My opinion is that in any event you ought to call for volunteers who wish to migrate, and to send them on here early in the Spring. 500

ignorance of the fact that Minnesota was honeycombed with Métis, plus his disregard for the niceties of the international law involved in the gathering of a military expedition on the soil of a foreign country, the United States, are blatantly evident in this letter.<sup>4</sup>

Following a telegram from Macdonald John Rose, the official representative of Canada at London, urged the Imperial Government, as early as November 25, 1869, to employ Her Majesty's troops if necessary at Red River. Thus we see that by early Winter of 1869 the Canadian ministry seems already committed to a policy of forceful establishment of Canadian sovereignty at Red River by the employment of troops. No such policy was made public however. No explanation was given to the public at large nor on the floor of Parliament.<sup>5</sup>

This attitude of the "need" for forceful repression of the native inhabitants of Red River continued throughout December, 1869, to be advocated by McDougall, Rose, and Macdonald. Donald Smith of the Montreal office of the Hudson's Bay Company was commissioned by the Prime Minister to investigate and report about the situation at Red River. He, too, recommended troops to crush the insurrection.<sup>6</sup>

It should be understood that all negotiations between Ottawa and London were of a delicate nature. The suspicion of Prime Minister Macdonald that the Liberal ministry at London was lukewarm in its desire to preserve empire ties has already been alluded to. Also, the embarrassment of the Government of the young country should be known. Two and one-half years previously self-governing Dominion status had been achieved. Now, in its very first

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good men via St. Paul making a rendezvous at Georgetown could take the arms at that place and descend the river on rafts and take up a position on either side of the River near the boundary. . . . 1,000 more, for whose use boats should be built this winter, might be sent via Fort Williams."—McDougall to Macdonald, November 8, 1869, *Macdonald Papers*, "North-west Rebellion, 1869-1870," Vol. 2, 126.

<sup>4</sup> That McDougall indulged in prevarication is shown by what he wrote to Cameron later. "I have never proposed, contemplated, or asked for the aid of soldiers. If any fighting becomes necessary, it must be done by the loyal people of the Settlement in their own way and at their own time." McDougall to Cameron, November 30, 1869, *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, 517.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Rose to Macdonald, November 25, 1869, *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, 172.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Macdonald to McDougall, December 12, 1869, *Letterbooks*, Vol. 13, 715; Macdonald to Langevin, December 15, 1869; *Ibid.*, 739; McDougall to Macdonald, December 28, 1869, *Macdonald Papers*, Vol. 2, 317; Macdonald to Rose, December 31, 1869, Joseph Pope (ed.), *Memoirs of the Right Honourable Sir John Alexander Macdonald*, rev. ed., Toronto, 1930, 416; and Smith to Macdonald, January 4, 1870, *Macdonald Papers*, Vol. 2, 399-400.



undertaking the fledgling Dominion seemed to be confessing to failure and must call on the mother-country for help. It created a situation it could not control. It took upon itself a task it could not see through alone.

Next, there was diplomatic byplay between Ottawa and London concerning the procedure for transference of the former Hudson's Bay Company territory from the Crown to the North American Dominion. The original date agreed upon for transfer of sovereignty was December 1, 1869. Canada was to have made payment to Her Majesty's Government, and William McDougall was to have commenced his duties as the Ottawa-appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Canada's new domain in the West. By his rash and impolitic attempt to install himself ahead of time and his consequent forced retirement to American soil, the Governor-designate had caused a state of insurrection to exist in the territory. The native Métis, excluded from the negotiations that would determine their political (and probably economic) future, formed their own Provisional Government under the presidency of John Bruce who was later succeeded by Louis Riel. Their purpose was to seek more equitable terms of admission to the Canadian Dominion. They had no desire to be "bartered like cattle," nor to become a "colony of a colony." With the political situation in the West thus radically altered the Macdonald government withheld payment for the territory to Her Majesty's government. Until the area could be turned over in a peaceful condition the purchase would not be completed. It was thus the duty of the Imperial Government to suppress the rising, and that with her own troops and at her own expense. When this should be done, then Canada would make payment. This view, of course, was not acquiesced in by London, not only because of the expense, but also because of the Liberal government's unwillingness to become involved in warlike maneuvers so near United States during the delicate post-Civil War years.<sup>7</sup>

A compromise, of course, was ultimately worked out. Both Canadian Volunteers and British Regulars marched westwards, and the expense was shared by both governments. That the heavy hand of force should be used against the natives of the Northwest seems to have become the crystallized policy of the Macdonald Government by mid-Winter.<sup>8</sup> Such policy, to be sure, was not

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Granville to Sir John Young, January 8, 1870, *Macdonald Papers*, Vol. 1, 341-342.

<sup>8</sup> "...we must not relax our preparations to vindicate by force if necessary, Her Majesty's Sovereignty in the North West,..." Macdonald to Rose, February 5, 1870, *Letterbooks*, Vol. 13, 1023, 1022.

made public because of elements of sympathy in Canada itself for the people of Red River. Macdonald wanted Imperial troops in the Expeditionary Force because the Northwest was Imperial, but still not Canadian, territory. Even the Canadian Volunteers would be performing an Empire duty and not executing a Canadian invasion of a foreign country; moreover, they would be called for in Her Majesty's name. Before the end of January boats to transport the troops across the lakes had been arranged for. On February 11, 1870, the Canadian Government decided that troops should be on their way as soon as boats could move, for diplomatic negotiations with the delegates from Red River might break down.<sup>9</sup>

### Influence of Imperial Policy

As Winter blended into Spring a divergence in policy toward the rising at Red River became evident between the Ottawa government and the Home Government at London. Unlike the former, the latter committed itself to conciliation of the populace of the new territory. They urged conciliation on the Canadian Government and specified that Imperial troops could be employed only to maintain order and not for the forceful repression of the Métis. In granting the requested military assistance Lord Granville, Secretary of State for the Colonies, cabled Imperial policy:

The proposed military assistance will be given if reasonable terms are given to the Roman Catholic settlers and if Canadian Government enable H. M.'s Government to proclaim transfer simultaneous with movement of troops.<sup>10</sup>

Here we have the first evidence in either Canadian or Imperial correspondence that Canada should placate Catholics at Red River. (Those Métis who were French-speaking were Catholics; those who were English-speaking were Anglicans.) It appears to have been a new development to Governor-General Young also, for in his handwritten copy of this telegram he underlined "Roman Catholic," inserted an exclamation mark after them, and added (*sic*). At all events the British ministry wished to avoid all appearance of coercion in the dispatch of troops to Red River. They even desired that transfer of the Territory to Canada should be com-

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Macdonald to Rose, January 26, 1870, *Letterbooks*, Vol. 13, 964-965; S. J. Dawson to Macdonald, January 29, 1870, *Macdonald Papers*, Vol. 2, 533; and "Minutes of the Committee of Council," February 11, 1870, *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, 358.

<sup>10</sup> Granville to Young, March 5, 1870, *Macdonald Papers*, Vol. 1, 403.

pleted together with or previous to their departure. Moreover, they wanted the Imperial troops withdrawn as soon as possible.<sup>11</sup>

The stand thus taken by the Imperial Government was not to the liking of Prime Minister John A. Macdonald. He had no desire to deal gently with the Métis if it could be avoided. This he adroitly refrained from making public, however. By early April he seemed less anxious about a too early payment of the purchase price of the Northwest and more anxious to get troops there to fix Canadian authority. To Governor-General Young he wrote:

We will accept transfer at once—if England sends troops to act with ours and suppress the insurrection as proposed in our O[rder in] C[ouncil] of 11 Feb. and acceded to by Lord G[ranville]'s cable tel[egram] of 5 March.<sup>12</sup>

On the day following he gave to Young a full statement of his perplexity about the conditions under which England might be willing to send Imperial troops.

The difficulty that I feel is this: Lord Granville says in his tel[egram] that if we accept the Country, England will send troops, but in his instructions to Sir C[linton] M[urdoch] he says the troops are not to be used to force the people to unite with Canada—in other words to be of no use. Now if we accept the Country we are committed to its conquest and must go on.

We can't return the Country to Her Majesty or the H. B. Company.

Again, why should we agree to pay for troops that may be ordered not to act when they get to Fort Garry? . . . I think a tel: communication to the following effect might go—

Canada will accept transfer at once, if regular troops are sent to be used if necessary to put down insurrection.<sup>13</sup>

The Governor-General upon receipt of the above communication from the Prime Minister replied, in conjunction with the special envoy of the Home Government, Sir Clinton Murdoch, who was now with him, that the words: "if regular troops are sent to be used if necessary to put down insurrection" should not be employed. He then suggested that Macdonald and Sir Gorges Étienne Cartier and possibly others come for a verbal discussion at the Governor-General's office with himself and Murdoch.<sup>14</sup> We do not know what conclusions were reached at this conference, but it appears

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Rose to Macdonald, March 23, 1870, *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, 547.

<sup>12</sup> April 9, 1870, *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, 516.

<sup>13</sup> Same to same, April 10, 1870, *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, 517-518.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Young to Macdonald, April 11, 1870, *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, 521-522.

that the Canadian Ministry was forced to back down from its demand for a strict guarantee that Imperial troops should be used if necessary to suppress the Métis of Red River. In the next telegram from Granville, April 23, 1870, no mention was made of the British Government's having provided any such guarantee.<sup>15</sup>

It is not improbable that Murdoch may have undertaken to convince the Canadian Prime Minister not by a theoretical but by a practical argument. He may have suggested that the latter's worries were needless, because actually no resistance would be offered the troops anyway. Murdoch, the Ministry, and the Governor-General had become convinced by the end of April at least, that the approach of the troops would mean the flight of Riel to American soil and the collapse of the Provisional Government at Red River. They thought (wrongly in fact) that Riel's support had been melting away. Murdoch wrote the Colonial Office as follows: "It is considered certain that Riel, on the advance of the Expedition, will leave the territory and seek refuge beyond the British Dominion."<sup>16</sup>

From this basic decision and conviction the Ottawa Government did not deviate in the weeks following. Thus soon afterwards, May 10, 1870, on the floor of Commons Georges Cartier, Acting Prime Minister during the illness of Macdonald, felt confident enough to insist without qualification that the troops for Red River were being sent merely on a peaceful mission. "It was necessary that her [Queen's] authority should be established there, and it was for that purpose the expedition was to be sent, and not for the purpose of carrying on war."<sup>17</sup> That the Acting Prime Minister persisted in this conviction we know from what he wrote shortly before his death to John A. Macdonald. He recalled to the latter the purpose of the military expedition as explained to the Red River delegate, Father N. J. Ritchot, by Governor-General Young.

In the interview of the 19th [May, 1870], Lord Lisgar [Young] gave assurance to Father Ritchot that the military expedition was going to Red River not to arrest anyone, but to maintain order, as done by any garrison of regulars in any Canadian city where there was one.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Granville to Young, *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, 525-526.

<sup>16</sup> Murdoch to Sir Frederick Rogers, April 28, 1870, Canada, *Journals of the House of Commons*, 1874, Vol. 8, Appendix, 6, "Report of the Select Committee on the Causes of Difficulties in the Northwest Territory in 1869-1870," 194. Hereinafter this source will be referred to as *Causes of Difficulties*.

<sup>17</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, 3rd Session, Vol. 1, 1870, 1551.

<sup>18</sup> Cartier to Macdonald, February 8, 1873, *Causes of Difficulties*, 105. Sir John Young subsequently became Lord Lisgar.

From the foregoing analysis we can discern the position of the Canadian and Imperial governments in the matter of sending troops to Red River in the Spring and Summer of 1870. But what was the reaction of the people of Red River themselves, the native Métis? How did they view the approach of this military force? Was it coming to maintain law and order in their midst, or to crush them for having refused admittance to McDougall? Was its role to be that of protector, or would it open the gates for the inrush of greedy and exploiting strangers from the East?

The passage of the Manitoba Bill, May 3, 1870, granting provincial status to the Red River Settlement would seem to have quieted the fears of the natives. They had signified on June 24, 1870, their willingness to enter the Canadian Dominion. However, the distrust of Prime Minister Macdonald for the Métis of the Northwest and their leader, Louis Riel, had long been evident. The natives could not then be sure of his intentions. In commissioning the Catholic Bishop of Ste. Boniface, Antonin A. Taché, to make the Dominion acceptable to the inhabitants of Red River Macdonald had shown himself adroit. For his part the Bishop was too trusting of the Canadian Ministry. He was a native of Quebec, beloved by the simple Métis, and at this time in his late thirties.

## Influence of the Orange Society

An event occurred on March 4, 1870, at the Red River Settlement which goes far to explain the apprehension of Riel and the French Métis especially to the approach of a military expedition from the East. On that day an immigrant from Ontario had been executed at Fort Garry for armed rebellion and repeated insubordination. His name was Thomas Scott, a hulking bully-boy, who had emigrated to Canada itself in 1864.

Once it became known back in Ontario that Scott was a member of the Orange Society all the furor and pressure of that Society was organized in a grand campaign of vengeance on those responsible for the death of Brother Scott. The fact that the execution had taken place on territory over which Canada had no legal or constitutional authority or control did not dim the organized urge for vendetta. At lodge meetings, at public indignation gatherings, in the newspapers, and in the Legislative Assembly of Ontario, as well as on the floor of the Dominion Parliament at Ottawa, the cry went up for the head of Riel and anyone else responsible for the



execution of Orangeman Scott. The Conservative Ministry of Macdonald and Cartier was besieged by angry demands from Ontario that the executioners be punished.

How to punish legally a deed performed before there was any Canadian authority at Red River was the nub of the problem. The execution had occurred on March 4, 1870. Canada did not obtain sovereignty till July 15, 1870. Wrathful Ontario demanded punishment, but the ministry had no constitutional way of inflicting it. It was a matter for the Imperial Government itself, and the latter's policy, as we have seen, was one of conciliation of the inhabitants of the Northwest. Legally and constitutionally, then, Orange Ontario's thirst for revenge was frustrated. However, another avenue was open.

Were Canadian Volunteers called for to march with British Regulars to Fort Garry? Good. This was the opening Ontario Orangemen wanted. They enlisted by the hundreds, so that they constituted the bulk of the force. They did not keep secret their vengeful intentions; yet they were allowed to enlist and to embark. Their aim was to capture Riel and whosoever else should be "guilty" and see to their punishment. Throughout the long journey from May 20 to August 27 their intentions were not effectively frowned on by the authorities. As events were to show they did carry out their vengeful plans by every means at their disposal.

Bishop Taché was not slow to detect the anxiety of the Métis at Red River over the coming of troops there. Upon his first return to Ste. Boniface in March he informed Joseph Howe, Secretary of State for the Provinces in the Macdonald Ministry, of the dislike of the people of Red River for the proposed military expedition. "The threat of sending troops is, without doubt, the greatest obstacle to conciliation."<sup>19</sup> In early June he reported to the same Howe that general uneasiness was giving way to grave apprehension regarding the oncoming expedition, so that some were speaking of new troubles and possible resistance. "... I solemnly gave my word of honour and promised even in the name of the Canadian Government that the troops are sent on a mission of peace..."<sup>20</sup> Whatever his personal anxieties, the Bishop nevertheless continued his efforts to calm the fears of the native Métis. If the new Governor-

<sup>19</sup> Taché to Howe, March 11, 1870, *Causes of Difficulties*, 21.

<sup>20</sup> Same to same, June 9, 1870, *Macdonald Papers*, Vol. 3, 39. Bishop Taché had been commissioned on February 16, 1870, by Prime Minister Macdonald to act at Red River in the name of the Canadian Government.—*Cf. Causes of Difficulties*, 19.

designate, Adams Archibald of Nova Scotia, would come in with the troops or even prior to them all would be well. He would be the civil authority and would control the military. In fact Bishop Taché assured Riel, probably because he was himself assured by Archibald, that the new Lieutenant-Governor would arrive *before* the troops.

M. Archibald regrette de ne pouvoir arriver par la voie de Pembina, son desir néanmoins est d'arriver au milieu de nous, et avant les troupes. En consequence il sera heaueux qu'on lue trouve un chemin soit par la Pointe les Chênes ou le lac des Roseaux.<sup>21</sup>

For his part Louis Riel, President of the Provisional Government, expressed his desire to welcome the new authority. "My profoundest respect to Mr. Archibald; we much desire his coming."<sup>22</sup> The Bishop continued to the same effect on August 5. "Le Gouverneur Archibald partira de même jour [August 8], mais par un autre chemin. Il arrivera avant les troupes, et je lui ai promis une bonne reception, s'il arrive par le chemin de Snow."<sup>23</sup>

After landing at Thunder Bay on the North shore of Lake Superior the leader of the expedition, Colonel Garnet Wolesley, saw fit on June 30 to state himself that the purpose of the Expedition was one of peace.<sup>24</sup> This proclamation Riel had printed and distributed throughout the Settlement. Furthermore Wolesley also appealed to Bishop Taché and J. H. McTavish, the Hudson's Bay Company officer at Fort Garry, for aid in securing Métis labor in extending eastwards the Snow Road.<sup>25</sup>

I have begged him [J. H. McTavish] to render every assistance in his power in obtaining the labor and funds required for this service [extending the Snow road eastwards]. I have the honor to request your Lordship's earnest cooperation in doing so, and being aware of the anxiety of your people to welcome us amongst them, I am led to hope that they will avail themselves of this opportunity of proving the sincerity of their wishes.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Taché to Riel, no date, published in *La Minerve*, Montreal, September 29, 1870, p. 2, col. 5.

<sup>22</sup> Riel to Taché, July 24, 1870, *Causes of Difficulties*, 37.

<sup>23</sup> Taché to Riel, August 5, 1870, published in *La Minerve*, September 9, 1870, p. 2, col. 5.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Alexander Begg, *The Creation of Manitoba, or a History of the Red River Troubles*, Toronto, 1871, 383; and Taché, A. A., *The Northwest Difficulty, Bishop Taché on the Amnesty Question*, as appeared in the *Times*, (London), April 6, 7, and 8, 1874, no place no date, 12b.

<sup>25</sup> This incomplete wagon road was projected from Ste. Boniface east to Lake of the Woods. Had it been finished the expedition could have marched in on it. Instead it proceeded by a longer route to Lake Winnipeg from where it entered the mouth of the Red River. It thus advanced on Fort Garry from the North.

<sup>26</sup> Wolesley to Taché, June 30, 1870, Taché, *Northwest Difficulties*, 13b.

It is certain that the French Métis did respond to this appeal, even in their state of doubt about the intentions of the advancing troops. Moreover, the English and Scotch Métis did not respond. This we know from the witness of J. H. McTavish.

... I issued notices in the Colonel's [Wolesley's] name, calling for men to commence the work, and went myself through the English portion of the Settlement, but failed in getting a single English half-breed or Swampy [Indian]. None but French half-breeds offered, though it was given out and well understood, that the road was to be pushed through in order to hurry in Her Majesty's troops.<sup>27</sup>

### Role of Bishop Machray

A new influence made itself felt at this point. The part played by the Anglican bishop of Rupert's Land, Robert Machray, at that time thirty-nine years of age, should be understood. He had long been of the opinion that Imperial troops were needed to insure stability at Red River, as they had done on previous occasions. He expressed his views in writing to the Governor-General on March 18, 1870. Benjamin Sulté, private secretary of Archibald and member of the Red River expedition, has recorded that the Anglican Bishop of Rupert's Land had, despite Riel's proclamation that no resistance would be offered the troops, written to Wolesley on July 25, 1870, that it would be exceedingly unfortunate if the Expedition did not arrive until after Governor Archibald.

J'ai peur que l'on adopte le projet de faire arriver ici le gouverneur avant nous. Ce serait la démarche la plus maladroite et la plus malheureuse que l'on pourrait faire; il est bien difficile de dire à présent quelle serait dans ce cas la position du gouverneur. Profitez donc de toutes les chances que vous pourriez avoir pour jeter sans retard une force armée parmi nous.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Quoted by S. J. Dawson in his "Report on the Red River Expedition," Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1871, Vol. 6, No. 47, p. 25. Dawson himself has commented that the reason the English language Métis did not cooperate was that the Red River terminus of the road was in the French portion of the Settlement.

<sup>28</sup> Machray to Wolesley, July 25, 1870, Benjamin Sulté, *L'Expedition Militaire de Manitoba, 1870*, Montreal, 1871, 35. Sulté does not say where he found this letter. The fears of Bishop Machray were by no means shared by the Hudson's Bay Company agent at Fort Garry, J. H. McTavish. "Whatever you may hear from others to the contrary, I feel confident that the Provisional Government are determined *coute que coute* to hand everything over quietly to the proper authorities, and in no case do I apprehend any rising on the part of the English or Indians." McTavish to Taché, July 31, 1870, *Causes of Difficulties*, 36. With regard to the arrival of the new Lieutenant-Governor the same correspondent declared: "...I consider it highly advisable that Mr. Archibald should be on the spot, at least as soon as the troops." Same to same, July 31, 1870, *Ibid.*, 36.



In early August the Bishop sent the English speaking Métis Joseph Monkman with letters from himself and others at Red River to Colonel Wolesley providing information about the Provisional Government and supplies needed by the troops. The Bishop expressed his fears about the instability of the peace and urged the rapid approach of Wolesley's force. These letters Monkman delivered on August 4. On August 12 Wolesley received another communication from the anxious bishop pleading for one hundred men and a couple of guns at once. Moreover the Bishop took practical measures to assure the hastening of Wolesley's troops. A subscription among the English language parishes made possible the sending of six boats to assist the Expedition down the Winnipeg River from Rat Portage. One of his own clergy, J. P. Gardiner, took personal charge of the boats.<sup>29</sup> All this is confirmed by the author of the "Narrative of the Red River Expedition":

A number of the English-speaking people of the lower Red River Settlement had, under the sanction of the Protestant Bishop, started off up the Winnipeg River to meet us with some large Hudson Bay boats, having experienced guides and crews, for the purpose of assisting us in descending that river... under charge of the Rev. Mr. Gardner [*sic*], an English clergyman...<sup>30</sup>

Thus we see that the English speaking portion of the population in conjunction with Bishop Machray, unlike the French, did want the military authority ahead of the civil authority. This in fact was how the issue was resolved. That the rapidity of the last stages of Wolesley's march was the reason Lieutenant-Governor Adams Archibald arrived so much later than he did seems to be confirmed by Archibald himself in his first report to Secretary of State for the Provinces Joseph Howe. "Colonel Wolesley made the latter part of his march with such rapidity that he was within a short distance of Upper Fort Garry, before it was known there that he had arrived in the River."<sup>31</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Robert Machray, *Life of Robert Machray*, London, 1909, 210-211; also Dawson, "Report on the Red River Expedition," *loc. cit.*, 22.

<sup>30</sup> *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, Vol. 109, 168b-169a; cf. also same, 168a-168b.

<sup>31</sup> Archibald to Howe, September 3, 1870, Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1871, Vol. 5, No. 20, p. 9. Sulté has recorded that Archibald had been following one day behind the Expedition. But owing to the final burst of speed of the regular troops, he was left seven days behind. Cf. *L'Expedition Militaire de Manitoba*, 1870, 45.

## The Tactics of Wolesley

Colonel Gamet Wolesley seemed to find it easy to suspect the motives of Louis Riel. He allowed himself to be influenced by false reports that Riel intended to fight. Such was his explanation to Bishop Taché days later after his arrival:

We were quietly advancing certain to meet no resistance, when passing through the little village of Winnipeg, two horsemen arrived at full speed exclaiming: "Colonel Riel and his men want to fight!" You understand Monseigneur that I then had to take some military precautions to approach the Fort.<sup>32</sup>

The Colonel advanced up the Red River by stealth and caution. Messengers and scouts whom Riel had sent to meet him he arrested and detained. Their failure to return convinced the Métis Chief that Wolesley's intentions, despite his declaration of June 30 from Thunder Bay that his mission was one of peace, were nothing less than hostile. The Officer of the Expeditionary Forces who authored the "Narrative of the Red River Expedition" has accurately described the tactics of Wolesley: "We took every possible precaution to prevent intelligence of our arrival in the river from reaching Fort Garry. No one was permitted to pass in that direction, although every one was allowed to come within our line of skirmishers."<sup>33</sup>

It was too late now for resistance even if the Provisional Government had intended it. Following the counsel of Father Ritchot and Bishop Taché Riel was determined to hand over the reins of government peacefully to legitimate Canadian authority. Assuredly the new Governor was not another McDougall. Riel's work was now finished. He had already dismissed his potential army of a thousand Métis. Bishop Taché maintained outward optimism till the very eve of Wolesley's arrival with the British regulars. But to Riel it was obvious that he would have to seek safety in flight. He informed the Bishop of his conviction that the Ottawa politicians had deceived the prelate from first to last.<sup>34</sup> As the troops were entering the Fort, the President of the Provincial Government, his guard already dismissed, crossed the Red River and made his way to exile in Pembina and later Saint Joseph, Dakota Territory. It

<sup>32</sup> Quoted from memory by Bishop Taché, Taché, *Northwest Difficulty*, 14b-15a.

<sup>33</sup> *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, Vol. 109, 175a-b.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. G. Dugas, *Histoire véridique des faits qui ont préparé le mouvement des Métis à la Rivière Rouge en 1869*, Montreal, 1905, 192.

was an inglorious exit from office after nine months of nerve-racking work. Riel had even prepared an address of welcome for the incoming Lieutenant-Governor.<sup>35</sup>

Red River thus had no civil authority from the time of Riel's departure, August 24, till the arrival of the Lieutenant-Governor, September 2, for Louis Riel had been empowered by the Dominion Government to continue in office until the coming of Adams Archibald.<sup>36</sup> On his own authority alone Colonel Wolesley called on Donald Smith to act as temporary civil ruler.

Parenthetically we can ask: what could have happened to the Red River Expedition had the Métis determined to resist? It was quite possible that the force could have been destroyed. If necessary, guerilla warfare could have been conducted all the way from Thunder Bay to Fort Garry. None of the Expedition had had any experience with such fighting, and they were altogether unfamiliar with the difficult terrain. Moreover, down the rapids of the Winnipeg River logs could have been floated to demolish the small boats the soldiers were in. In fact Indians had volunteered to do this should Riel approve. Also, as the force slogged its way toward Fort Garry across the rain-created, treeless morass on the morning of August 24, it could easily have been annihilated by a well-defended Fort with its numerous cannon. Resistance to Imperial authority, however, the Métis did not want.

## Importance of the New Governor's Arrival

The timing of the Lieutenant-Governor's arrival was important because it would have much to do with the behavior of the troops. If he arrived before them, he would have a better chance to control them. If he arrived after them, he could not. It was to the advantage, then, of the vengeance-seekers that they seize those whom they regarded as blameworthy during a period of confusion and under the covering of military operations. This was in fact what actually happened. Some notion of their movements can be learned from Donald Smith's account in Commons the year following.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Riel to Taché, July 24, 1870, A. G. Morice, *A Critical History of the Red River Insurrection*, Winnipeg, Canadian Publishers, 1935, 341.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. deposition of Fr. Ritchot, *Causes of Difficulties*, 77. Governor-General Sir John Young also favored this function for Riel. "The Government must I suppose be left in Riel's hands until the possession of the country can be taken by H. M. troops." Young to Macdonald, April 7, 1870, *Macdonald Papers*, Vol. 1, 508.

A number of excited people—some forty or fifty of them—came to him (Smith) asking to be sworn in as special constables to arrest the murderers. They said, "We will go to shoot them down, but not to take them in any other way." They demanded a warrant to commit murder, in fact. He [Donald Smith] refused them a warrant. . . . This was before the arrival of Governor Archibald.<sup>37</sup>

The new Governor could have come by way of St. Paul and Pembina, either in company with Bishop Taché, who was completing a second journey to Ottawa, or separately. He could have followed the expedition and himself have come in the Snow Road, if it had been completed. Finally, he could have followed the Expedition north to Lake Winnipeg and thence to the Red River Settlement. The last was the route he chose. In an early communication to Cartier he congratulated himself on his choice: "I am very glad that I came in here by the lakes. If it had been otherwise it would have injured me very much with that part of the settlement, whose violence it is at this moment of vast importance to be able to restrain."<sup>38</sup> The new Lieutenant-Governor seems to be saying that it was good policy for him not to return in the company of Bishop Taché via Saint Paul. He appears to have thought that this would constitute a siding with one portion of the Settlement, viz., the French. Thus he does not seem concerned about how much his action has titled the scales *against* the French Métis, who were already subject to a reign of terror at Red River. Further, his procedure is all the more surprising when we consider the instructions given him by the Dominion government. "You will also take measures to protect Immigrants flowing into that country, *and to restrain them from any lawless intrusion upon the settlers* or upon Indian tribes which may be calculated to provoke resistance."<sup>39</sup>

## Arrival and Aftermath

On August 24, 1870, the Imperial soldiers led by Colonel Garnet Wolesley marched into the Red River Settlement and occupied Fort Garry. On August 27 the Canadian Volunteers came in and re-

<sup>37</sup> *Parl. Debates*, 4th Sess., Vol. 2, 1871, p. 1043. Brackets mine. "When these men applied for a warrant, the Lord Bishop of Rupert's Land and a number of the most respectable men in the place were present." *Ibid.*, p. 1044.

<sup>38</sup> Archibald to Cartier, September 10, 1870, *Causes of Difficulties*, 137-138.

<sup>39</sup> "Instructions to Archibald," Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1871, Vol. 5, No. 20, p. 5. Italics mine.

leased their frustrations in drinking and brawling uncontrolled by the ineffective police force which Donald Smith had attempted to organize. The British regulars returned to the East on September 3, the day following the entry of Lieutenant-Governor Adams Archibald. Despite his avowed peaceful intentions of the previous month Colonel Wolesley on the day following his arrival made it understood that he had regarded the leaders of the Provisional Government as "outlaws" from whose "tyranny" he would deliver the Settlement.<sup>40</sup> This ultimate display of his true colors did not prevent the ambitious Wolesley from being feted in Montreal nor from subsequent promotion in the British forces.<sup>41</sup>

Two unpunished crimes committed by the vendetta-inspired Canadian Volunteers may be singled out: the murder of Elzéar Goulet and the bayoneting of André Nault. In mid-September, 1870, the former was recognized in Winnipeg and supposed to have assisted personally in the execution of Thomas Scott. He was chased by a mob including two Volunteers and drowned attempting to swim the river to safety. Sticks and stones had been hurled at him, and, since he sank suddenly, one at least must have struck his head.<sup>42</sup>

In March of the year following André Nault, an uncle of Louis Riel, was bayoneted on American soil by Canadian Volunteers and left for dead. Actually he later recovered. The perpetrators of this deed were never punished.<sup>43</sup> The lawlessness of the Volunteers

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Dawson, "Report on the Red River Expedition," Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1871, Vol. 6, No. 47, p. 25; F. H. Schofield, *The Story of Manitoba*, Winnipeg, 1913, Vol. 1, 297; George Young, *Manitoba Memories*, Toronto, 1897, 188. With regard to Wolesley's remarks about "banditti" flying at the approach of the troops Dawson has written: "The people to whom he [Wolesley] alludes instead of flying at his approach like banditti, were quietly following their usual occupations, except those who were out, at his particular request, making a road to facilitate the movements of Her Majesty's troops, and the soldiers had had experienced guides on the Winnipeg, although the contrary is implied. *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Editorial, *Gazette*, Montreal, September 30, 1870, p. 2, col. 1.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. news dispatch, *Gazette*, Montreal, October 7, 1870, p. 1, col. 8. For the official report of the Lieutenant-Governor on this incident cf. Archibald to Howe, September 17, 1870, Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1871, Vol. 5, No. 20, p. 15. The Colonial Office in London made anxious inquiries about Goulet's death, as Howe informed Archibald. Cf. Howe to Archibald, November 14, 1870, Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1871, Vol. 5, No. 20, 51-52; Archibald to Howe, December 7, 1870, 52; Report of H. J. G. McConville to Archibald, September 27, 1870, 52-54; Howe to Archibald, December 27, 1870, 54; and Howe to F. Turville, December 27, 1870, 54.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. news dispatch, *Herald*, Montreal, March 15, 1871, p. 2, col. 6; also March 21, 1871, p. 4, col. 1.



after their arrival at Red River was not officially intended when they were dispatched, yet it is a fact whether intended or not.

## Conclusion

The military expedition to Red River in 1870 has recently been termed a "crackpot crusade."<sup>44</sup> Perhaps this description is accurate as far as the Canadian Volunteers are concerned, but the Expedition was more than that. We have seen that as far as the Imperial Government were concerned it was a peaceful symbol of transfer of sovereignty and a guarantee of order but in no sense a punitive force. No one was to be arrested nor punished, and the people of the Northwest were not to be united forcibly to Canada. So much for British official policy as determined by the Liberal Ministry in London. This policy the Canadian Government had perforce to acquiesce in officially and openly if British assistance both military and financial were to be made use of. As far as angry Orange Ontario was concerned the Expedition must above all capture and punish the executioners of Orangeman Scott. Official declarations to the contrary notwithstanding such was the determination of the overwhelming number of Canadian Volunteers most of whom were from the Province of Ontario.

Thus there were official policy on the one hand and contrary facts on the other. The Expedition was not officially punitive in character but was so in fact. Moreover the thirst for vengeance on the part of the Volunteers was not hidden from the authorities both military and political. Even the British leader, Colonel Garnet Wolesley, at length accepted it and connived at it upon his entry into Red River Settlement. It appears that Prime Minister Macdonald would please pro-Métis supporters by theoretical statements of official policy and at the same time please anti-Métis elements by the cold facts of vengeance at least partially achieved. The true purpose of the Expedition was one thing. The manner of its fulfillment was quite another.

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<sup>44</sup> J. K. Howard, *Strange Empire*, New York, Morrow, 1952.



## Terence V. Powderly and the Knights of Labor

In 1886 the Order of the Knights of Labor, with a membership exceeding 700,000, stood as the dominant organization in the American labor movement. For a time it seemed as though it was destined to absorb all other unions and become the sole representative of American workingmen. Yet within a few short years the Knights as an important working-class body had disappeared. While the reasons for its failure are many, a study of the man who was its leader during its years of national prominence reveals both the strength and weaknesses of the Knights and throws much light upon this chapter of labor history.

Terence Vincent Powderly, head of the Order from 1879 to 1893, was born in Carbondale, Pennsylvania, on January 22, 1849, the son of Irish parents who had migrated to America in 1827. First entering the labor movement in 1871 by joining a local of the Machinists and Blacksmiths International Union, his ascent to national leadership was rapid, and in September 1879 he was chosen to succeed the retiring Uriah S. Stephens as Master Workman of the Knights of Labor.<sup>1</sup>

During the eighties Powderly was by far the most popular and renowned labor leader in the United States. His vision of a better world, his voluminous correspondence with the rank and file, and his obvious sincerity and sense of dedication and mission all contributed to his great appeal. It was, in fact, in the field of publicity and education that he made his greatest and most enduring contribution to the labor movement. Powderly developed nothing original in the way of organizational technique or policies. His major accomplishment was to draw attention to American workers and to make workingmen aware of a growing labor movement. However, as we will see, Powderly was more a reformer than a job- and wage-conscious labor leader, and drew more from the humanitarian heritage of the ante-bellum period than he contributed to the development of American labor ideology.

<sup>1</sup> Powderly to James E. Barrett, January 15, 1889, Powderly Papers (Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C.). Unless otherwise noted, all manuscript citations are from this collection. See also Powderly's autobiography, *The Path I Trod*, New York, 1940.

The most important ingredient in Powderly's philosophy was a desire to destroy the wage system. As he often stated: "The aim of the Knights of Labor—properly understood—is to make each man his own employer." This hostility toward capitalism was based more upon emotional than scientific reasoning, for he once wrote that he would banish the term "class" from the English language if he could do so. Powderly had little knowledge of the socialist analysis of society, and never assigned a significant role to economics as a factor in the development of society.<sup>2</sup>

Powderly then faced the more practical problem of adopting a course of action resulting in the abolition of the wage system. Because of his reform heritage and failure to understand the importance of economic factors, he could never fully comprehend the need for economic action by the working class. Rather he proclaimed over and over again the importance of education as the primary means of superseding the wage system. Always counselling patience and forbearance, he warned that the process of education could not be successful in a matter of a few months. In 1886, at the height of what historians have termed the "Great Upheaval," he asked workingmen to "submit to the injustice at the hands of the employer in patience for a while longer," for first their own condition and that of the employers had to be studied and understood. After laborers had learned what they were "justly entitled to . . . the tribunal of arbitration . . . [would] settle the rest."<sup>3</sup>

Despite the evident disinclination of employers to raise wages or shorten hours, Powderly suggested that all employers and employees should each form their own trade organizations, mutually adopt a price and wage scale, and then boycott those refusing to be bound by the agreement. In 1888 he polled the Knights for

<sup>2</sup> *Journal of the Knights of Labor*, XIII (May 4, 1893), 5; *Journal of United Labor*, I (June 15, 1880), 21; Powderly, "The Organization of Labor," *North American Review*, CXXXV (August 1882), 123; *Knights of Labor, Proceedings of the General Assembly, 1880*, 170; Powderly, *The Path I Trod*, 161, 427.

Powderly was contemptuous of all socialists, and generally used the term to denounce those of whom he was not fond. In 1880 he accepted a membership card in the Socialist Labor Party from Philip Van Patten, the party's national secretary. But Powderly never took any action on it, accepting it as a gesture of friendship; *Knights of Labor, Proceedings of the General Assembly, 1887*, 1536. Cf. also Powderly to Robert D. Layton, May 1, 1882; Powderly to Chester A. Arthur, November 11, 1884; Powderly to John W. Gilson, April 6, 1886.

<sup>3</sup> Secret Circular of March 13, 1886, reprinted in Missouri Bureau of Labor Statistics and Inspection, *The Official History of the Great Strike of 1886 on the Southwestern Railway System*, Jefferson City, 1887, 70-71.

the purpose of establishing an "Educational Fund," to which contributions would be voluntary. Although the answer was an affirmative one, the fund never amounted to more than \$20,000. In the end little was accomplished. The rank and file appeared to be more interested in practical results than they were in education.<sup>4</sup>

Combined with Powderly's belief in education was an abiding faith in co-operation as a means of abolishing the wage system. Powderly had grown to maturity at a time when the communitarian movement, as propounded by Fourier and Brisbane, was still strong. He retained in later life the conviction that society could be reconstructed along co-operative lines. In the late eighties, influenced by a reading of Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward*, he became an adherent of the Nationalist movement. Until 1885 the concept of co-operation played a significant role in the history of the Knights. Numerous co-operative projects were undertaken, but most of them failed. Although Powderly recognized that co-operative enterprises were bound to fail unless sufficient capital could be secured, he never took any action that might have resulted in the raising of funds, contenting himself instead with speeches attacking the existing system and advocating co-operation as an alternative.<sup>5</sup>

A natural outgrowth of his repugnance toward the existing industrial system was his hostility toward trade unionism. Rejecting the pragmatism of a trade unionist such as Samuel Gompers, Powderly looked upon higher wages or shorter hours as mere palliatives which would bring about no permanent betterment of the workingman's condition. While proclaiming his dislike of trade union aims and methods, he nevertheless insisted that no real conflict existed between the Knights and the unions, and in fact issued invitation after invitation for trade unions to enter the Knights as a body. Later, when the labor movement was nearly rent asunder by the conflict between the two groups, Powderly took the position that it was a war between individuals rather than organizations. In 1889 he privately described the leaders of the American Federa-

<sup>4</sup> *Journal of the Knights of Labor*, XII (January 28, 1892), 1; *Journal of United Labor*, VIII (March 31, 1888), 2602, (May 26, 1888), 2633; *Knights of Labor, Proceedings of the General Assembly, 1888, Report of the General Treasurer*, 13; 1889, *Report of the General Secretary Treasurer*, 13; 1890, *Report of the General Secretary Treasurer*, 9.

<sup>5</sup> Powderly, *Thirty Years of Labor, 1859 to 1889*, Columbus, 1889, 460; *Knights of Labor, Proceedings of the General Assembly, 1880*, 170-171; Powderly to Henry E. Sharpe, October 23, 1883; Powderly to Felix Adler, January 20, 1884; Powderly to unidentified correspondent, c. February 20, 1890.

tion of Labor as a group of "damn gin guzzling, pot bellied, red nosed, scab faced, dirty shirted, unwashed, leather arsed, empty headed, two faced, rattle headed, itchy palmed scavengers." Yet Powderly was capable of writing that he had never held "but the friendliest of feelings for the Trades Unions of America."<sup>6</sup> In other words, he drew a fine distinction between the membership and leadership of the trade unions, refusing to recognize that a unionist such as Gompers relied upon rank and file support.

By the mid-eighties the differing objectives of the Knights and the unions resulted in open conflict. While the Order sought to introduce a co-operative society, the unions accepted capitalism and worked within the existing structure for increased benefits. The fight began to rage in earnest after hostilities commenced between the Knights and the Cigar Makers' International Union, which was led by Adolph Strasser and Gompers. At the 1886 General Assembly of the Order, District Assembly 49, center of anti-unionist sentiment, had enough power to secure passage of a resolution ordering all members of the Knights, under pain of expulsion, to leave the C.M.I.U. Unwilling to engage in a long drawn-out fight, Powderly was unhappy at this turn of events. In desperation he interpreted the resolution as broadly as possible, promising dispensations if C.M.I.U. members belonging to the Order would promise to desist from harmful activities. At the same time Powderly avoided antagonizing District Assembly 49, although he did work quietly for repeal of the resolution, which he ultimately ruled unconstitutional and which was rescinded the following year. But the crucial moment for compromise had passed, since the trade unions had already embarked on a war to the finish. Powderly, caught between District Assembly 49 and the C.M.I.U., did little. The militant Strasser and Gompers were determined to ensure the total supremacy of the trade union form of organization, and Powderly proved no match for them.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Powderly to Tom O'Reilly, December 19, 1889; Powderly to J. T. Lavery, July 15, 1890; Powderly to J. T. Tuohy, November 7, 1890; Powderly to J. P. McDonnell, September 24, 1892; Powderly to James Rogers, December 19 1892; *Journal of United Labor*, I (June 15, 1880), 21, and VIII (September 10, 1887), 2486; *Journal of the Knights of Labor*, XIII (January 12, 1893), 1; Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers, *Proceedings*, 1886, 1807-1808, 1818-1819; *John Swinton's Paper*, June 20, 1886; *Cigar Makers' Official Journal*, XI (August 1886), 6; *The Carpenter*, VI (October 1886), 1.

<sup>7</sup> Powderly to Henry Dettman, August 11, 1886; Powderly to Charles H. Litchman, April 17, 1886; Powderly to John O'Keefe, January 3, 1887; Powderly to J. F. Cronin, February 10, 1887; Powderly to Edwin M.

Certain traits in Powderly's character created numerous difficulties during his leadership of the Knights. Often intolerant of dissenting views, he tended to exaggerate the relative importance of his own position. In the administration of the Order he was unable to delegate responsibility to subordinates, and insisted upon supervising even minute details. His relations with the General Executive Board were not always close. While the Board worked under a common roof in Philadelphia, Powderly remained a hundred miles distant in Scranton, journeying only infrequently for meetings with the Board. He spent much of his time writing letters, many of which expressed dissatisfaction with his heavy burdens.<sup>8</sup>

When events moved rapidly, Powderly frequently demonstrated an inability to meet changing conditions, often offering the poor state of his health as an excuse for inaction. Moreover, when hundreds of thousands of workingmen flocked to the Order's banner in the feverish years of 1885 and 1886, Powderly did little more than issue complaint after complaint. He insisted that striking workingmen could not be admitted to membership, that such rapid growth was unhealthy, and that he could not possibly keep pace with ensuing developments. On more than one occasion he suggested that the General Executive Board prohibit strikes altogether and recall the charters of those assemblies which disobeyed the order.<sup>9</sup>

The faith placed by Powderly on arbitration, conciliation, and education was naturally reflected by his actions as head of the Knights. His handling of the eight-hour agitation during the eighties serves as an example of his methods. In 1884 the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions had selected May 1, 1886, as the date on which all workingmen were to press for the eight-hour day.<sup>10</sup> The Order too, from its inception, had also been a partisan of this cause, but had always been vague as to the means of implementing it. Its support, at least in theory, was primarily

Blake, March 18, 1887; Powderly to John B. Dempsey, April 1, 1887; Powderly to John Devlin, September 14, 1887; Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1886, 42, 200, 282; 1887, 1528-1531, 1677, 1732-1733, 1822-1823.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Powderly to Frederick Turner, December 31, 1885; Powderly to John W. Hayes, April 29, 1887; Powderly to John J. Roche, August 12, 1887.

<sup>9</sup> Powderly to Edward B. Irving, December 4, 1885; Powderly to Frederick Turner, December 31, 1885; Powderly to Dan F. Tomson, January 23, 1886; Powderly to Michael Healy, December 1, 1886; Powderly to John W. Hayes, January 13, 1888. Cf. also Powderly's Secret Circular of March 13, 1886, reprinted in *Official History of the Great Strike*, 69-75.

<sup>10</sup> Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions of the United States and Canada, *Proceedings*, 1884, 14.



a concession to the strong feelings of workingmen toward eight hours. Powderly and other leading officials, however, emphasized that the abolition of the wage system would automatically resolve the problem. They argued that a reduction in hours was a mere palliative.

In 1885 Powderly advised the General Assembly that no attention should be given the movement because most people were ignorant of its significance. Furthermore, neither the date nor the plan of action were appropriate. In his famous Secret Circular of March 13, 1886, he ordered all assemblies to refrain from striking for eight hours under the impression they were obeying the wishes of the General Assembly. At the 1886 convention he affirmed his opposition to the means adopted by those active in the movement. Powderly's hostile course stirred the wrath of many trade unionists, and this was in part responsible for the alienation of the unions from the Knights.<sup>11</sup>

In 1888 the A. F. of L. embarked on another eight-hour crusade but soon came to the conclusion that better results could be achieved if the movement were confined to those trades having at least a fair chance of success. The date chosen to press for eight hours was May 1, 1890. Gompers wrote the Knights requesting its co-operation, and Powderly introduced a resolution in support of the movement. But no aid was forthcoming on the part of the Order, and Powderly reiterated his opposition to the means chosen by the trade unions, privately condemning the leaders of the A. F. of L. in derogatory language. Although he favored eight hours in theory, his hostility toward any concrete plan made him in effect an opponent of the movement. Powderly's disregard of the great appeal of the eight-hour movements ultimately drove many workingmen into the arms of the trade unions, where their aspirations seemed to have a better chance of early realization.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1885, 15; 1886, 39, 273, 278; Powderly, *Thirty Years of Labor*, 495-505; Powderly, "The Army of the Discontented," *North American Review*, CXL (April 1885), 369-377; *Official History of the Great Strike*, 72-73; Powderly to John Franey, December 4, 1885; Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions of the United States and Canada, *Proceedings*, 1886, 6.

<sup>12</sup> A. F. of L., *Proceedings*, 1888, 25; 1889, 29-30; Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1889, 51-52; Powderly to John W. Hayes, December 15 and 16, 1889; Powderly to A. R. Lake, December 21, 1889; Powderly, "The Plea for Eight Hours," *North American Review*, CL (April 1890), 464-469; Gompers to A. W. Wright, July 10, 1893, Gompers Letter Books (A. F. of L.-C. I. O. Building, Washington, D. C.). Cf. also Powderly to M. J. Byrne, December 21, 1889; Powderly to M. M. Cullen, May 21, 1888; Powderly to Tom O'Reilly, December 19, 1889; Powderly to J. T. Lavery, July 15, 1890.

Emphasis upon the abolition of the wage system led Powderly to condemn the use of the strike by workingmen. Regarding higher wages and shorter hours as expedencies, he naturally opposed strikes as a means of securing such objectives. Furthermore, feeling that the destruction of the wage system had to be preceded by the enlightenment of the people as to their true interests, Powderly opposed the strike *per se*, and probably would have fought against its use even as a means of introducing the co-operative society. Despite his hostile attitude, however, it was clear that workingmen were more interested in tangible benefits than they were in the reformation of society, and one of their prime weapons was the strike. Pressure from the rank and file forced the Order to establish successively a Resistance Fund, a Defence Fund, and an Assistance Fund. The attitude of Powderly and other leaders, in addition to the fact that inadequate revenue was provided for, insured the ineffectiveness of such funds. Powderly's dislike of anything remotely related to strikes was illustrated by his pronouncements. In 1880 he suggested that the money in the Resistance Fund be used for co-operative purposes. In 1883 he complained that the "number of appeals for assistance... is frightful... my advice... is to shut down on all appeals and stick to the original plan of the order, that of educating the members as to the folly of strikes." Two years later he recommended the abolition of the Assistance Fund, and in 1888 informed the Knights that had the money spent on strikes been utilized for education, strikes would have been rendered needless.<sup>13</sup>

Despite Powderly's opposition, however, he was forced to participate actively as head of the Order in some strikes involving its members. The first major strike he took part in came in 1885 when the Knights won a startling victory over Jay Gould. A wild-cat walkout on the Wabash line following a 10 per cent wage reduction had caught Gould totally unprepared, and in September Powderly negotiated a favorable settlement. Members of the Order were not to be discriminated against; locked-out employees were to be reinstated as quickly as possible; and Powderly in turn promised that in the future no strike would take place until there had been a meeting with railroad officials.<sup>14</sup> The Southwest strike,

<sup>13</sup> *Pittsburgh Times*, July 16, 1883; George E. McNeill, ed., *The Labor Movement: The Problem of To-day*, Boston, 1887, 415-416; Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1880, 169-170, 172; 1883, 405; 1885, 23; 1888, *Report of the General Master Workman*, 3; Powderly to William A. Varner, February 8, 1883.

<sup>14</sup> Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1885, 87-91.

commencing six months later, presented a completely different situation, for Gould was well prepared for any trouble. Indeed, he may have courted it with the intention of destroying the power of the Order on his lines.

A walkout on the Texas Pacific took place on March 6, 1886, ostensibly because of the discharge of C. A. Hall, a member of the Order. Actually the workers had for some time expressed a growing discontent with the railroad's policies. By March 10 the men of the Missouri Pacific, controlled by Gould, had also left their jobs. The leader of the strike was Martin Irons, chairman of the Executive Board of District Assembly 101. He was not, as Powderly later claimed, a novice; rather he evinced many qualities of successful leadership.<sup>15</sup>

Following the discharge of Hall, the Executive Board of District Assembly 101 sent out telegrams to all locals under its jurisdiction asking for support. In response to the affirmative replies a walkout was ordered on March 6. Neither Powderly nor the General Executive Board knew of the walkout until after its inauguration. The vice-president of the Missouri Pacific blamed Powderly for the stoppage. Powderly in turn asked for the reinstatement of Hall pending a full investigation, but to no avail. An attempt by the governors of Missouri and Kansas to get H. M. Hoxie, manager of the Gould system, to meet with a committee of the Order also proved fruitless. Hoxie was unalterably opposed to a meeting with any representatives of the Knights, favoring only a meeting with actual employees.<sup>16</sup>

At this critical juncture Powderly, on March 13, chose to issue a Secret Circular to all members of the Order. This quickly reached the hands of the newspapers and became public property. In this manifesto Powderly condemned strikes in any form.

A stop must be called and the ship brought back to her moorings. It has always been, and is at the present time, my policy to advocate conciliation and arbitration in the settlement of disputes... Thousands of men who have become disgusted with the ruinous policy of the strike... were drawn to us because we proclaimed to mankind that we had discarded the strike until all else had failed... No matter what advantage we gain by the strike, it is only medicating the symptoms; it does not penetrate the system,

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 1886, 82-83, 164-165, 170-172; Martin Irons, "My Experiences in the Labor Movement," *Lippincott's Magazine*, XXXVII (June 1886), 618-627.

<sup>16</sup> Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1886, 81-82; Ruth A. Allen, *The Great Southwest Strike*, Austin, 1942, 63-64.

and therefore fails in effecting a cure. . . . You must submit to injustice at the hands of the employer in patience for a while longer. Bide well your time. Make no display of organization or strength until you have every man and woman in your department of industry organized, and then do not strike, but study, not only your own condition, but that of your employer. Find out how much you are justly entitled to, and the tribunal of arbitration will settle the rest.<sup>17</sup>

These sentiments had been expressed by Powderly in the past, but their reiteration at this critical moment served only to place the head of the Order in the contradictory position of publicly opposing a strike of which he was the leader. The irony of the situation must have appeared highly amusing to Gould and served only to stiffen his determination to break the power of the Knights on his railroad system.

Powderly then agreed to Irons' request that he go to New York City and endeavor to see Gould. On March 28 the meeting took place. Gould adopted the position that as one of several directors he had no power to intervene personally. He finally agreed to send Hoxie a telegram instructing him to give preference in rehiring to employees of the railroad, and not to discriminate against the Order. The crucial section of the message stated; "We see no objection to arbitrate any differences between the employees and the company, past and future." There is some circumstantial evidence indicating that Gould sent Hoxie another message that was never made public. Although Powderly had no legal authority to end the strike, since that power was vested in the originating authority, the Executive Board of District Assembly 101 honored the settlement and ordered the workers to return to their jobs.<sup>18</sup>

This settlement was too vague to provide the basis for a lasting agreement. Ensuing events proved this, for after the strike had ended Hoxie issued a statement that he was willing to meet a committee of employees "who are actually at work in the service of the company." This was interpreted so as to exclude negotiators of the Knights representing the workers. The Executive Boards of District Assemblies 101, 93, and 17, after being informed by Hoxie that only 50 per cent of his former staff would be rehired and that only he would decide who would be taken back, had no choice

<sup>17</sup> *Official History of the Great Strike*, 70-71.

<sup>18</sup> Powderly to Martin Irons, March 25, 1886; Powderly to Jay Gould, April 11, 1886; "Investigation of Labor Troubles in Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, Texas, and Illinois" (1888), *House Report* 4174, 49 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 22, 37, 40-41; *Official History of the Great Strike*, 75-76.

but to order the strike to continue. Even before this the Knights' General Executive Board had retracted its instructions ending the walkout.<sup>19</sup>

Throughout the entire affair Powderly insisted that the workers had erred in striking. After Gould reneged on the March 28 agreement Powderly refused to seek another conference. On April 11 he asked Gould to force Hoxie to comply with the settlement, even divorcing Gould from any responsibility for Hoxie's actions. But soon Powderly was convinced that Gould was as "untruthful as the devil," and issued an appeal to the Order for financial aid. At the same time, however, he wrote to John W. Hayes and Charles H. Litchman, two prominent officials of the Knights, asking them to serve on a committee which would investigate his contention that the strike was a rebellious move by the workers intended to defy the authority of the General Executive Board. Finally, on May 3, the Board unconditionally called off the strike.<sup>20</sup>

After the strike the Knights rapidly lost ground among the men of the Southwest, many of whom resented what they considered to be a betrayal of their interests by the Order. Powderly, however, always maintained that he had been thrust into an unfortunate situation not of his own making. He refused to face the fact that employers at that time would rarely concede anything to the workers unless forced to do so by superior strength. Any concession gained by labor usually required a strong union to see that the gains were maintained. Yet during the walkout Powderly wistfully wrote to Gould suggesting that the Knights would withdraw from the strike if Gould would reach an equitable settlement with the workers on his own. Many strikers also felt that a serious error had been committed in surrendering unconditionally to Gould, for the hope that the congressional committee investigating the strike would protect the workers never materialized.<sup>21</sup>

A few months later, following quickly upon the heels of the disastrous defeat inflicted by Gould, came the Chicago stockyards

<sup>19</sup> *Official History of the Great Strike*, 78-80, 87-88; "Investigation of Labor Troubles," Pt. I, 27.

<sup>20</sup> Powderly to James Ward, April 8, 1886; Powderly to William O. McDowell, April 8, 10, 11 and 13, 1886; Powderly to Jay Gould, April 11, 1886; Powderly to Frederick Turner, April 12, 1886; Powderly to "the Order Wherever Found," April [?] 1886; Powderly to John W. Hayes, April 14, 1886; Powderly to Charles H. Litchman, April 17, 1886; *Official History of the Great Strike*, 101, 111-112.

<sup>21</sup> *Journal of United Labor*, VII (November 10, 1886), 2200; *New Haven Workmen's Advocate*, March 5, 1887; Powderly to Gould, April 11, 1886; "Investigation of Labor Troubles," Pt. I, 17.



strike. Powderly's actions in this walkout served only to confirm the poor impression gained by many who felt that his handling of the Southwest strike was one of the prime reasons for its failure.

During the May 1886 eight-hour agitation the Chicago stockyard workers had successfully struck for eight hours. Throughout the summer the packers attempted to reduce wages. When the workers refused to accept the cut the employers reinstituted the ten-hour day. The General Assembly, then in session, decided to send T. B. Barry, a member of the General Executive Board, to Chicago with instructions not to involve the Knights. Barry, upon his arrival, concluded an agreement with two companies to order the strike off and have the men return to the ten-hour day. At a later date the two companies were to break away from the packers' organization and institute an eight-hour day with nine hours pay. Barry agreed to this settlement because he felt the workers were "fighting a losing fight." The workers returned to work only to go out on strike two weeks later. Barry returned to Chicago and the General Executive Board sent Albert A. Carlton to assist him, again with orders not to involve the Knights.<sup>22</sup>

Prior to Carlton's arrival in Chicago, Powderly sent the following communication to Barry:

In a circular issued March 13, 1886, I stated the policy of the Knights of Labor on the eight-hour question. . . . In opposition to that circular the men at stockyards struck for eight hours. . . . You were sent to try and settle. . . . You settled by ordering the men back at the old hours. They have, in violation of law and your order, and without notifying us, again struck for eight hours. The Board instructs you and Carlton . . . to settle by putting the men back at the old hours. . . . If the men refuse, take their charters. We must have obedience and discipline.

This dispatch, immediately becoming public property, strengthened the determination of the packers not to concede. While Powderly was uninformed of Barry's previous agreement, the moment was not propitious for such instructions. Barry and Carlton immediately wired Powderly of their opposition to his instructions, but by that time it was too late to affect the outcome. Powderly was bitterly condemned by the stockyard workers, and the Knights entered a spiral of decline in Chicago. Barry was so incensed at Powderly's

<sup>22</sup> Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1886, 174-175; 1887, 1419-1420; Barry to Powderly, October 19, 1886; Barry to Powderly and the General Executive Board, November 7, 1886; Powderly, *The Path I Trod*, 149-152.

actions that an open break occurred between the two men, and two years later Barry was expelled from the Order, largely at Powderly's behest.<sup>23</sup>

Like many other labor leaders, Powderly also participated in politics. As head of the Knights he was in large measure responsible for its political policy, and his own personal experiences often conditioned his political attitude. Between 1878 and 1882 Powderly took part in Pennsylvania politics under the auspices of the Greenback Labor Party. During these years the Order worked closely, although unofficially, with that party. Nevertheless, Powderly maintained that no man could be forced to vote for a particular candidate, and he consistently proclaimed that the purpose of the Order was to educate men and parties. At the same time he stated that he would recommend voting for a candidate who was a member of the Order in place of one who was not. Although generally advocating a nonpartisan political attitude, Powderly's actions also were in part motivated by personal ambition. While publicly stating that he belonged to no party, he often engaged in negotiations in the hope of being elected to high public office. Although he declined in 1882 the nomination for Secretary of Internal Affairs in Pennsylvania, his reluctance was due primarily to his

<sup>23</sup> Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1887, 1421, 1482-1485. Joseph R. Buchanan in his autobiography claimed that Powderly called off the strike after receiving a letter from a Roman Catholic priest exhorting him to end the suffering and misery of the workers and their families. Powderly, on the other hand, claimed that he had not opened the letter until *after* the strike had been called off. Actually it matters little whose version is correct for, in any case, Powderly's course would probably have been similar. His ideological hostility toward strikes insured his lack of sympathy toward the stockyard workers.—Joseph R. Buchanan, *The Story of a Labor Agitator*, New York, 1903, 319-322; P. M. Flannigan to Powderly, October 16, 1886, reprinted in Powderly, *The Path I Trod*, 147-148; Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1887, 1479.

Powderly so resented what he regarded were unjustified attacks upon his actions during the Southwest and stockyards strikes that during the walkout on the Reading Railroad system in the winter of 1887-1888 he decided not to interfere in any way. Although tempted to step into the strike, he changed his mind, explaining to Hayes on January 13 that "From the information at hand and from the experience of the past I am led to the opinion that my interference will do no good and inasmuch as I have been blamed for failure of the Southwest strike, the Stock yards strike and other strikes in which I was forced to interfere after they had been started without any advice from me, I feel that I am justified in doing as much as the man requested 'in keeping hands off' and giving them a show;" Powderly to Austin Corbin, January 12, 1888 (letter never sent); Powderly to John W. Hayes, January 13 and February 7, 1888; Powderly to Charles H. Litchman, February 13, 1888.

belief that the Greenback Labor Party had cheated him out of a seat in Congress.<sup>24</sup>

Powderly's disillusionment was the occasion for a change in the Order's political policy, and the close relationship with the Greenback Labor Party was dissolved. For the succeeding four years the problems of growth and strikes took up so much time that Powderly gave little attention to politics. His attitude was also influenced by the realization that labor participation in politics had not met with notable success, and the experiences of the National Labor Union only heightened this fact.<sup>25</sup>

However, he was unable to renounce politics completely, and after 1882 attempted to use his influence in the legislative arena. In February, 1884, Powderly appeared before a congressional committee in support of an anti-contract-labor bill being pushed by Local Assembly 300. In 1885 he suggested that the Order establish lobbies in state capitals and also in Washington. The following year Powderly was momentarily caught up in the political enthusiasm engendered by the "Great Upheaval," and he endorsed a plan to build up a congressional labor bloc. At the same time he refused to permit the Order to become involved with the National Union Labor Party, heir to the Greenback Labor Party.<sup>26</sup>

After 1886 Powderly directed his major efforts toward forging a working alliance with the American farmers. The steps in this direction were motivated only partly by a hope of inducing the farmers to affiliate themselves with the Order. Equally important was Powderly's desire to secure agrarian support in the legislative halls of the nation. Such a coalition was perfectly compatible with his reformism. Seeking the establishment of a society of small producers, he assumed the existence of a community of interests between farmer and worker.<sup>27</sup>

Yet Powderly, although moving in the direction of an agrarian alliance, still affirmed his nonpartisanship. In 1888 he reiterated

<sup>24</sup> Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1880, 258; Powderly, *Thirty Years of Labor*, 285-286; McNeill, *The Labor Movement*, 417-418; *Journal of United Labor*, III (June 1882), 241-242; Powderly to Joseph Labadie, November 13, 1882.

Between 1878 and 1884 Powderly also held the post of mayor of Scranton.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Gerald N. Grob, "Reform Unionism: The National Labor Union," *Journal of Economic History*, XIV (Spring 1954), 126-142.

<sup>26</sup> Powderly, *Thirty Years of Labor*, 444-447; Powderly to George Edmunds, January 14, 1885; Powderly to Ralph Beaumont, July 27, 1886; Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1885, 16; *Journal of United Labor*, VII (February 5, 1887), 2276.

<sup>27</sup> *Journal of the Knights of Labor*, XII (April 28, 1892), 1.

his belief that when an officer entered the service of a political party he had a moral obligation to resign from the Order. Powderly's ambitions, however, induced him to engage in secret political negotiations with both major political parties in the fall and summer of 1888. Although no results were forthcoming, it is by no means certain that Powderly would not have accepted a sufficiently tempting offer.<sup>28</sup>

Between 1889 and 1892 the alliance between the Order and farmers grew closer together. In December 1889 Powderly attended the farmers' convention in St. Louis. Nevertheless, throughout this period Powderly consistently maintained that when he voted for a farmer-labor party, it was only as an individual and not as a Knight. Each step that he took was a cautious one. In 1890 he conducted a poll to determine the sentiment of the rank and file toward political action. When chosen as a delegate to the convention of the People's Party in 1892 he refused, stating that he would attend, but only as an individual. During the ensuing campaign he was lukewarm toward Weaver's candidacy, doing little except writing letters. His lack of enthusiasm for Weaver was evident when he expressed a preference for Harrison rather than Cleveland.<sup>29</sup>

Powderly's political beliefs were generally in keeping with the majority of trade union leaders. Except when personal ambition became important, he retained a nonpartisan attitude with an emphasis on the value of the lobby and support of candidates friendly toward labor. His moves in the direction of a farmer-labor alliance were partly motivated by a hope of preventing a numerically powerful element within the Order from committing that organization to a particular political party. After Powderly's exit the Knights joined in full support of Bryan in 1896.<sup>30</sup>

In Powderly's vision of a united working class striving for the abolition of the wage system and the establishment of a co-operative society, there stood certain barriers that could not be ignored, namely

<sup>28</sup> Powderly to I. N. Ross, September 11, 1888. I have also benefited immensely from the excellent study by Edward T. James, "American Labor and Political Action, 1865-1896: The Knights of Labor and Its Predecessors," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1954.

<sup>29</sup> *Journal of the Knights of Labor*, X (January 16, 1890), 1-3; (April 24, 1890), 1; (May 1, 1890), 1; (June 5, 1890), 1; XI (October 16, 1890), 1; XII (June 2, 1892), 1; XIII (June 30, 1892), 1; Powderly to A. H. Shank, January 15, 1892; Powderly to F. Reed Agnew, June 14, 1892; Powderly to J. A. Fox, September 30, 1892; Powderly to G. F. Washburn, October 13, 1892.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *Knights of Labor, Proceedings of the General Assembly, 1896*, 51-52, 59-60.

the problems of female, Negro, Chinese and immigrant labor. These groups were often utilized by employers in the capacity of cheap labor or strikebreakers, thus undermining the effectiveness of labor organizations.

In admitting women to the Order, Powderly ruled in 1881 that separate forms and rituals for women were unnecessary, and during the eighties the Knights became the first major labor body to include thousands of women workers within its ranks.<sup>31</sup>

On the pressing issue of the admission of Negroes, Powderly expressed his opinion that color was not a qualification for membership. At the Richmond General Assembly in 1886 he permitted himself to be introduced by a Negro delegate from New York City. Powderly felt that cheap Negro labor had to be eliminated if white labor was to organize effectively. While the Knights did organize tens of thousands of colored workingmen, there was much rank and file pressure to separate or exclude the Negro altogether. This pressure forced Powderly to adopt a moderate position. "The color line cannot be rubbed out," he wrote in 1887, "nor can the prejudice against the colored man be overcome in a day. I believe that for the present it would be better to organize colored men by themselves." In 1889 he informed the St. Louis farmers' convention: "We believe the Southern people are capable of managing the negro. . . . The social relations of the races is not the question. . . . we do ask that where the black man becomes a lever with which to oppress the white man . . . he shall be protected . . . When it comes to my home that is my concern, and none have the right to say with whom I shall associate there."<sup>32</sup>

In the area of immigration Powderly adopted a position common to most contemporary labor leaders. In 1884 he supported the restriction of European immigration. "There is grave danger," Powderly told the Order eight years later, "that in a babel of tongues we may forget that we are freemen in this country, and in losing sight of that fact allow the incoming horde to Europeanize us before we can Americanize them." His views in regard to the Chinese were quite similar. In 1880 he supported attempts to force Congress

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, September 1879, 125, 131; Norman J. Ware, *The Labor Movement in the United States 1860-1895*, New York, 1929, 348; Powderly, *The Path I Trod*, 384.

<sup>32</sup> Powderly to J. Stewart, October 8, 1879; Powderly to W. H. Lynch, April 13, 1886; Powderly to J. M. Bannan, July 8, 1887; Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1880, 257; Powderly, *Thirty Years of Labor*, 651-660; *Journal of the Knights of Labor*, X (January 16, 1890), 1-2.



to abrogate the Burlingame Treaty, and at the General Assembly ruled against a point of order permitting the Chinese to join the Knights. In 1882 Powderly went to Washington to lobby for the termination of the Burlingame Treaty. When news of the Chinese massacre in 1885 at Rock Springs, Wyoming Territory, involving members of the Order, became known, Powderly retreated somewhat from his earlier position, expressing the thought that perhaps the Knights had gone too far. His attitude in regard to the Chinese, however, never underwent any significant transformation.<sup>33</sup>

In 1893 Powderly was deposed by an alliance of Western agrarians headed by James R. Sovereign of Iowa and socialists led by Daniel De Leon of New York City. The difficulty arose when Powderly, who had the constitutional power to present to the General Assembly nominees for election to the General Executive Board, refused to present men acceptable to the convention. His action led one delegate to remark:

I have become convinced, since the opening of this session, that the General Master Workman holds as his enemy every delegate who does not vote in accordance with his views on all questions, and appears unwilling to place in nomination for the General Executive Board any man who is likely to stand up for his own opinions when they happen to conflict with those of his chief.

Powderly twice resigned in the hope of forcing the convention to accede to his wishes. The second time the General Assembly, to Powderly's consternation, accepted his resignation and elected James R. Sovereign as his successor.<sup>34</sup>

The end of Powderly's career as leader of the Knights of Labor also marks the conclusion of a significant chapter in the history of the labor movement. Powderly was the final representative of a group of labor reformers hoping to return to a pre-industrial society. But the time for such a change had passed. By 1900 the frontier was gone; suitable land for farming had all been taken up; and large-scale enterprise was dominant. As a result Powderly's reform program did not fit the environment, for the *raison d'être* had been cut away from many of the old objectives. The technology and organization of society had made the co-operative workshop some-

<sup>33</sup> Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1884, 575-577; 1892, 5; *Journal of United Labor*, 1 (August 15, 1880), 39; Powderly, *Thirty Years of Labor*, 426-427; Powderly to unidentified correspondent, November 19, 1882; Powderly to J. W. Adams, February 7, 1883; Powderly to Thomas Neasham, October 31, 1885.

<sup>34</sup> Knights of Labor, *Proceedings of the General Assembly*, 1893, 7-61.

what of an anachronism, and the ideal of the small producer was technologically obsolete. Perhaps the best summation of Powderly's years of leadership in the labor movement was expressed in a letter written shortly before his deposition as head of the Knights:

I have held a most anomalous position before the public for the last 20 years. All of this time I have opposed strikes and boycotts; I have contended that the wage question was of secondary consideration; I have contended that the short-hour question was not the end but merely the means to an end . . . but all of this time I have been fighting for a raise in wages, a reduction in the hours of labor or some paltry demand of the trade element to the exclusion of the very work that I have constantly advocated. Just think of it! opposing strikes and always striking; opposing a battle for short hours and lacking the time to devote to anything else. Battling with my pen in the leading journals and magazines of the day for the grand things we are educating the people on, and fighting with might and main for the little things. Our Order has held me up to the present position I hold because of the reputation I have won in the nation at large by taking high ground, and yet the trade element in the Order has always kept me busy at the base of the breast works throwing up the earth which they trampled down. Again, no man in this country has so many domineering bosses as I have, for every member feels it to be his right to sit down and abuse me, if he pleases or order me around to do as he likes and not as I think. . . . On the other hand my relations with my brother officers . . . are not pleasant . . . I who have been preaching independence for others have been the slave of thousands, and as my reward am as little understood by the people I work for as Hoke Smith or Dink Botts.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Powderly to Mrs. A. P. Stevens, April 11, 1893. I have not touched upon Powderly's actions in the difficulties between the Knights and the Catholic Church during the eighties. Aside from being too long, the story has been more than amply related and documented by Henry J. Browne in *The Catholic Church and the Knights of Labor*, Washington, D. C., 1949, and "Terence V. Powderly and Church-Labor Difficulties of the Early 1880's," *Catholic Historical Review*, XXXII (April 1946), 1-27. As Father Browne has pointed out, the difficulties which churchmen and labor leaders had to adjust revolved around the Knights' oath-bound secrecy, its Masonic aspects, its resemblances to the Molly Maguires, and its apparent socialistic or radical character. Powderly's version of the troubles in a chapter in his autobiography entitled "Ecclesiastical Opposition" (*The Path I Trod*, 317-381), is not fully authenticated either by his personal papers nor the views of prominent churchmen. Powderly claimed that the Catholic Church leaders of the eighties "advised obedience to the established order" (*Ibid.*, 342). Within the Church, however, as in contemporary American society, all shades of opinion existed on the so-called "labor problem."

# A Note on Early Sonora and Arizona

## Father Kino's *Chomites*

Studying the numerous works pertaining to the early spiritual conquest of the northwest of New Spain, one finds that not all investigators are in accord. There are points of no great importance perhaps, that have been variously presented and interpreted so as to clarify ambiguous statements or to inject some meaning to an obscure sentence. This procedure helped the investigator as well as the student, but, as further research throws more light upon the past, the variations should be dealt with more seriously for the sake of truth and benefit of future scholars. The remarks that follow are offered not as criticism but in helpful sincerity and with due respect for those that have preceded me in the rugged study of Spanish manuscripts, some of which are of illegible scription and nearly all of intricate phraseology, abounding in obsolete words and numerous abbreviations that defy unravelling.

Father Kino's *chomites* have puzzled various writers. When the renowned explorer-missionary of the southwest visited the native villages, to win over the aborigines he gave them *chomite colorado*. The item has been identified by the late Professor Herbert E. Bolton as a red bandanna, and Bolton dubs Kino's policy as "handkerchief diplomacy."<sup>1</sup> More recently Ernest J. Burrus, S.J., in his *Kino Reports to Headquarters* refers to *chomites colorados* as small red bandannas.<sup>2</sup> The Spanish phrase reads "... le puse un poco de chomite colorado en la caveza ..." which Burrus translates "I put a small red bandanna on his head." However, in nearly all instances where the noun *chomite* or its plural is used, it is found modified by the adjective "*poco*" meaning little and implying quantity or amount, not size.

Juan Matheo Mange in his *Luz de Tierra Incógnita* states: "... hallamos una ranchería en que conté 30 almas, hablándoles y dado un poco de chomite y agujas, proseguimos al Sur ...,"<sup>3</sup> which

<sup>1</sup> *Rim of Christendom*, New York, 1936, 150.

<sup>2</sup> Rome, Italy, 1954, pages 41, 73, 75; the Spanish phrase herein is on p. 74.

<sup>3</sup> Mexico, 1926, 231.

translated almost literally says: "We found a settlement in which I counted 30 souls; having talked to and given them a small amount of *chomite* and needles, we proceeded south." The fact that *chomite* appeared associated with needles offered a solution to the ambiguity; it refers to red coral beads, or a substance resembling coral reef from which the Indians could make beads and string them with the needles given. In support of this argument and perhaps to answer the query taking shape in the reader's mind, let me quote Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca who in 1536 visited the northern part of Sonora:

The people gave us many deer and cotton shawls better than those of New Spain, many beads and certain corals found on the South Sea, and fine turquoises that come from the north. Indeed they gave us every thing they had. To me they gave five emeralds made into arrowheads, which they use at their singing and dancing.<sup>4</sup>

On February 6, 1606, Captain Diego Martínez de Hurdaide wrote thus:

So that others might know the esteem in which the coral is held, all a soldier has to carry is six arm-lengths of the white and ninety beads of the red; said coral is brought by the aborigines from the Yaqui River, also from the Quivira River, where it is said it is found. I have witnessed how the Indians prize the red coral; they have it of the most vivid color and I had to trade two horses for the little I am sending as a sample. It is said that the Mayo Indians have much, but as they are at war, it has not been possible to enter and barter. There are also certain stones called turquoises of a hue similar to the seven small ones being sent along with the coral. They are beautiful and in demand in Guadalajara, Culiacán and other places from which agents are sent to buy them.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> *The Narrative of Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca*, edited by Frederick W. Hodge, in *Spanish Explorers in the Southern United States 1528-1543*, New York, 1907, 106; this is a most accurate translation of the *Relación de los Naufragios y Comentarios*, Madrid, 1906, I, 118.

<sup>5</sup> Unpublished manuscript in the Archivo General de la Nación, México, ramo de Historia, tomo 316, sección de Jesuitas, folios 39-149 titled: Carta y Relación que yó el General Diego Martínez de Urdaide envió al Excelentísimo Señor Virrey de la Nueva España para que la vea mi Padre Nicolás de Arnaya, Provincial de la Compañía de Jesús. The Spanish is as follows:

"Para que se vea de la consideración que será el coral que traen los naturales del Río Yaquimi, que allí dicen lo hay y en el Río de Quivira, lleva el soldado, por todo, seis brazas de lo blanco y noventa cuentas de lo colorado; qué estiman mucho los indios de lo colorado, lo hé visto; hay con más viva la color, y me costó dos caballos que dí por el que para muestra basta y se podrá sacar por el lo demás; los del Mayo poseen mucho y como están en guerra no se ha podido entrar a resgatar; así mismo hay unas piedras que llaman turquesas, muy hermosas, de la color de las siete pequenuelas que van con el dicho coral, que de Guadalajara, Culiacán y otras partes las envían a comprar."

It is to be noted that Hurdaide, while mentioning what he had heard as to the sources, skillfully evades an opinion as to the truthfulness of the statements. He definitely calls it coral, classifies it into two varieties, but as in the case of the turquoises, his careful wording implies a certain doubt. He may not have been well versed in paleontology or geology, but very likely knew that reef-building corals could only flourish in clean, shallow, fresh, sea-water, or he might have suspected that they were fossil corals of the Silurian type, favosytes or halysites. At any rate, they looked like corals, were so called by his men, all of whom were less learned than he, and in order to avoid responsibility, he sent samples. He names the two rivers where it was said the coral came from although the Quivira one—later explorers discovered—was as mythical as the province of the same name. As to the Mayo tribe, well, they were on the warpath and Hurdaide reports what he heard. The South Sea referred to by Núñez Cabeza de Vaca was one of the names given to the California Gulf. Thus, it is possible that towards the end of the century, when Father Kino came north, he had learned the true nature of the substance and initiated a new nomenclature. And as Father Burrus points out, *chomite* is synonymous with *zagalejo*, indicative of a gown, tunic or skirt, from which the learned Dr. Bolton deduced it might have been something that could be placed upon the head.

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## Notes and Comments

*Calendar of Philippine Documents in the Ayer Collection of the Newberry Library*, Edited by Paul S Lietz, was published toward the end of 1956. It will undoubtedly prove a great boon to scholars of many avocations, just as its predecessor, Ruth Lapham Butler's *Check List of Manuscripts in the Edward E. Ayer Collection* of the Newberry Library has been since its publication in 1937. These guides to materials are realizations of the ideal of the famed Library to render all possible aid to students and researchers.

In his introduction Dr. Lietz traces briefly the history of the collection of Philippine materials gathered by Mr. Ayer at the turn of the century, of their use by Blair and Robertson, of the subsequent additions of manuscripts, and of their coming to the Library. The three hundred and seventy items in the *Calendar* run to about seven thousand pages, and it must be said that Dr. Lietz has personalized them handsomely by giving all the necessary biographical data of each, the date and place of birth of the document, its author and addressee, the Spanish description of the time, the later characterization in English, and the technical data of its long life. Arranged chronologically the *Calendar* begins at the year 1557 and ends with the 1903 entry. To make the book more helpful the manuscript list is followed by a "Short Title List of Transcripts from Philippine Documents in the Spanish Archives," which runs to fifty pages and contains in chronological order items dating from *circa* A. D. 1280 to *circa* 1843.

A great number of the calendared items present an immediate challenge to research for a scholarly article or book. Titles and topics are plentiful for a wide variety of interested students: of ethnology, linguistics, administration, missions, trade, ecclesiastical history, colonialism, international relations, education, agriculture, and native customs. The book is beautifully printed and concludes its two hundred and fifty-nine pages with a fine index. It may be acquired from the Newberry Library for the reasonable sum of six dollars.

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Probably the most scholarly, native American historian of colonial times was Francisco Javier Alegre. Born in 1729 in Vera Cruz,

Mexico, and educated in the Jesuit schools there, he entered the Company of Jesus in 1747, and was ordained priest in 1754. After some years of writing and teaching in Yucatan he was assigned the task of producing a history of the Jesuits in New Spain in 1764. He had collected his materials and had prepared a first draft of the work when without warning on June 25, 1767, he and the other Jesuits were arrested and exiled from the Spanish possessions. He arrived in Bologna in 1768, and there until his death in 1788 he wrote his manuscript history. One of the several copies of this was published in three volumes in Mexico City in 1841-1842 by Carlos Maria de Bustamente. Despite its deficiencies in editing and printing it has been of great value to civil and Church historians as well as to anthropologists and geographers.

The first volume of a much needed new edition is now at hand: *Historia de la Provincia de la Compañía de Jesús en Nueva España*, Tomo I, Libros 1-3 (Años 1566-1596), Nueva Edición por Ernest J. Burrus, S.J., y Felix Zubillaga, S.J., Vol. IX of the Bibliotheca Instituti Historici Societatis Jesu, Rome, 1956. The work is very capably done by two veteran historians of the Jesuits and remarkably well printed. The authorities and documents used by Alegre are amply cited in footnotes, where too will be found disputed points and references to other documents not available to the exiled scholar. In an appendix of nearly a hundred pages there are twenty-two documents amplifying or explaining the 430 pages of the *Historia* covering the first thirty years of the activities of the Jesuits in North America. There is a bibliography of seventeen pages, an introduction of forty pages including a biographical sketch of Alegre, a description of his sources, and some citations from scholars of the esteem in which they held Alegre's work. A calendar list of the forty other works of the humanist and historian and an excellent index complete the 640 pages of this welcome volume.

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The Minnesota Historical Society in November of last year, the eve of the State Centennial, published a revised reprint edition of the first volume of William Watts Folwell's four volume *A History of Minnesota*. The set, completed between 1921 and 1929, has been treasured by scholars and constantly used by students of Minnesota history, but, while copies of the last three volumes are

still available, this first volume has long been out of print and classified as a collector's item. Folwell was eighty-eight years of age in 1921 when the first volume came from the press and he died four years short of a hundred when the last volume went to press. One of his many outstanding public services was his presidential term at the University of Minnesota from its beginnings in 1869 to 1884. His achievements are briefly recounted by Russell W. Fridley in the introduction.

The present edition is designed to keep the style and findings of Folmer as they were in the original text, even though many new materials have been found during the past thirty-five years and much research has been done on Minnesota from pre-statehood times to 1857, the period of the book. Mr. Fridley says in his introduction: "No attempt has been made to incorporate newly discovered sources or to bring Folwell's interpretations up to date in the light of subsequent research. Only minor errors have been corrected, and new maps and illustrations have been added." Scholars will be inclined to agree that substantially the findings of Folwell are still accurate. All but the rare book dealers will be happy over the availability of this new printing and the modest list price of six dollars and a half.

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One would have to be omniscient as regards literature of the world to pass competent judgment on the *Treasury of World Literature*, edited by Dagobert D. Runes and published in 1956 by Philosophical Library, New York. The huge tome of 1,450 pages, whose list price is \$15, has selections from poems, essays, dramas, novels, and orations of almost every people ancient and modern, each translated into English.

Rapid perusal of the contents reveals the natural defects and merits of such a vast compilation. There seems to be an overabundance of "snippings" which leave one unsatisfied by reason of their incompleteness; the presence of too many old "favorites" leaves one wondering why his own "favorites" were not chosen; there is many times a lack of sufficient explanation or explication; there appears to be a stress on scenes of violence and love; Hebrew figures in literature and oriental thinkers receive more prominence than is customary in anthologies. The merits of the collection are the great variety, the rareness or uniqueness of some selections, the useful-

ness as a guide to unheard of authors, and the availability of an armchair or bedside book for a few moments of reading.

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A newsletter written in German prior to 1506 describing the sea route from Lisbon to Calicut was printed in Germany a year or so after 1506. It was reprinted with some verbal changes by a second German press in 1508. Five copies of the two printings exist at present. One of the earlier is in the James Ford Bell Collection of the University of Minnesota Library. This was selected for publication in 1956 and now appears in the handsome little volume, *From Lisbon to Calicut*. The contents are a six page Commentary by John Parker, Curator of the James Ford Bell Collection; a Facsimile of the six page German letter in green type; the five page Translator's Note of Alvin E. Prottengeier in five pages; the Translation in six pages, and six pages of Notes and Bibliography. The unknown German writer, gathering jottings of information in Lisbon, evidently reported accurately what he had heard without distinguishing the true from the false. The book has value as one of a thousand new copies of the old letter and as an illustration of excellent format and typesetting. One of the copies now may become a library treasure for five dollars.

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To our knowledge the most complete study of the land, the people, and the resources of any state of the Union in *Virginia at Mid-Century*, published in 1955 by Henry Holt and Company. The author is Jean Gottmann of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, who is the French geographer noted for similar studies of European countries. In the 584 pages are to be found seventy maps, charts, and graphs besides the hundred pictures illustrating every kind of human activity in Virginia. Gottmann gathered his material by detailed studies of each county and city and of the farming, industrial, white-collar, and professional residents thereof. He has assessed the value and the potentialities of the great state in detail and has done so to the extent of making a living personality of Virginia. He has laid out a program by his critical evaluation whereby the people and their legislators can develop that personality

to its highest economic and cultural stature. His work is well planned and well carried out.

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The compact little *Chicago History*, published quarterly by the Chicago Historical Society, and edited, or better, written by Paul M. Angle, devoted its Fall, 1956, number to "Chicago in 1856." In choice pictures and prose Mr. Angle described the political, social, economic, commercial and cultural aspects of the fast growing city. This article concluded the centennial series printed in the three preceding numbers: "The World in 1856," "The United States in 1856," and "Illinois in 1856," all in all an informal but interesting volume.

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*The William and Mary Quarterly* for October, 1956, is quite noteworthy in that its one hundred fifty pages contains a symposium on the "History of Science" during the colonial period. The titles of the articles and documents indicate the coverage of the American scientific scene prior to 1776. "Cadwallader Colden's Extension of the Newtonian Principles," by Brooke Hindle, considers Colden's "audacious claim" that he "had discovered the cause of gravitation." Professor Genevieve Miller writes: "Smallpox Inoculation in England and America: A Reappraisal." Denis I. Duveen collaborates with Herbert S. Klickstein on "The 'American' Edition of Lavoisier's *L'art de fabriquer le salin et la potasse*." Harry Woolfe has "British Preparations for Observing the Transit of Venus of 1761." Whitfield J. Bell, Jr., edits "Nicholas Collin's Appeal to American Scientists" as expressed in "An Essay on Those Inquiries in Natural Philosophy, Which at Present are the Most Beneficial to the United States of America." And finally there is "Astrology in Colonial America: An Extended Query," by William D. Stahlman.

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Charles McKew Parr's *So Noble a Captain, The Life and Times of Ferdinand Magellan*, appeared in 1953 and was received with wide acclaim by a score of reviewers in popular and scholarly periodicals. It has now been translated into Spanish by Don José Alberich Sotomayor and published in Madrid by Editorial Sapiencia.



Commended for its historical objectivity, documentation even in minute details, and for its pleasant and easy narrative style, the translation, *Magallanes, Un noble Capitán*, may be considered as useful from another viewpoint, namely, for reading purposes in Spanish language and literature classes of the college level. The translation made with such care and literary grace by Alberich Sotomayor adds a pedagogical value to the work. This is not to say that it should be studied by students through an entire semester, but rather that it can be used for purposes of outside or additional reading, while some of the technical passages can be used as models of translation from one language to another. For the translator has conveyed the author's thought accurately in a simple style with a limited vocabulary and syntactical clarity, eschewing excessively technical vocables. Added to this, the book is so constructed that the action develops in a background of high adventure and ominous commercial and political intrigues, which so affect the destiny of the great explorer that in his tragic death one can see a climax analogous to that found in heroic tragedies. The narrative is one from real life and would have for students more value than the correlative readings generally chosen from fiction. All in all we have in this book, or in selected chapters from it, material calculated to interest, to educate, to instruct the reader by increasing his knowledge of the Spanish language while at the same time adding to his comprehension of the historical aspects of the great age of discovery and colonization.—Jaroslav Flys, Department of Spanish, Loyola University.